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Does the contaminated land regime impose stewardship 
obligations on owners of land? 
  
“We are concerned not just for this generation, but for future 
generations. Our concept of continuity and of passing on to the 
next generation something better than we have received in the 
past is uniquely understood and supported”, 1 John Gummer. 
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1 John Gummer, House of Commons Hansard, 18/04/1995, Volume 258, Col 48. 
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Abstract 
 
Arguments that stewardship should be adopted as the foundation for ownership, or 
that it already best reflects the nature of regulation of ownership of land within the 
English legal system, are often made. What tends to follow from these statements 
however is not an examination of regimes impacting on owners of land, but 
arguments justifying why having a system based on stewardship would be desirable 
from an ethical or ecological point of view. The veracity of claims that stewardship 
obligations form part of our legal system is not often tested. This thesis attempts to 
take a step back from arguments based on justifications for stewardship, and will 
instead examine one element of land regulation, the regulation of contaminated land, 
to determine whether stewardship can, and does, form the basis of this regulation and 
what this can tell us about the place of stewardship as a legal principle. 
 
After a brief general overview of the contaminated land provisions, contained in the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990, the thesis looks at the reasons why it is useful to 
examine the place of the principle of stewardship within the regime. The thesis then 
examines the nature of stewardship, as both a legal principle and an ethical one, and 
its manifestations in law, in order to determine the shape of a regime based on 
stewardship. It looks specifically at the justifications for stewardship in order to 
allow a deeper understanding of the meaning of stewardship, and then looks at the 
relationship between stewardship and ownership.  
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The second stage of the thesis is then to look at the contaminated land provisions to 
determine how the aim of improving the state of land for the future is reflected in the 
regime and where stewardship fits into this picture. The thesis does not deny that the 
regime has other aims and guiding principles, specifically the polluter pays principle, 
but it does deny that this is the only philosophy which motivated and colours the 
regime. In order to demonstrate this, the thesis makes a detailed discussion of the 
sorts of obligations and duties that come into play under the contaminated land 
provisions and the place of the owner of the land within this.  
 
It should become clear that the contaminated land provisions were implemented on 
the back of (amongst others) an aim of improving the state of land for future 
generations. This aim is at the very heart of stewardship, but the contaminated land 
regime does not perfectly mirror what we might expect from a regime based on 
principles of stewardship. This can be seen when the hallmarks of stewardship are 
compared to the reality of the contaminated land provisions. This lack of fit can 
however be explained, and does not mean that the argument presented here cannot be 
sustained.  
 
The reason, it is argued, is the content of the principles of stewardship themselves, 
and the difficulty of framing regulation on the back of these principles. Specifically 
uncertainty as to the future and the problem with regulation of decision-making 
processes pose problems for such regulation. As a result, even though there is this 
lack of fit, and to this extent the regime presents a compromise position, it is argued 
Emma Lochery 
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here that the contaminated land provisions are an example of land ownership 
regulation based on stewardship, and an often-overlooked example at that. 
 
As a result of this, the current interpretation and application of the regime, both in 
the courts and at local authority level, are mistaken in their reluctance to impose 
some form of liability onto owners of land where the owner did not cause or 
knowingly permit the contaminating substance to enter the land. The paper concludes 
by suggesting that an alteration to this interpretation, following recognition of the 
place of stewardship within the regime, would allow local authorities to carry out 
more remediation works and to recover the costs for doing so. This would mean that 
the regime would be better able to tackle the problem of historical contamination 
such that we can indeed pass land on in a better state than that in which we received 
it.  
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I: Introduction 
 
The current contaminated land provisions were introduced in 1995, and since then 
have been little used, and the role of owners of land within the regime has received 
little attention. This thesis attempts to look at this role in detail, and, in doing so, to 
attempt to understand at least some of the reasons as to why the regime is not 
operating as its ambitious provisions suggest. The starting point for the research was 
in beginning to understand how the provisions in the regime interact with the rights 
of owners of land. It became clear that the regime was more complex in this regard 
than was initially suspected and elements of stewardship became apparent in the 
regime. The thesis does not attempt to justify regulation on the basis of stewardship, 
nor to argue that the contaminated land regime takes the correct approach. Instead it 
simply aims to analyse the regime in such a way as to bring out some of the more 
unusual features of the regime and the philosophy behind them. It also hopes to 
suggest that the interpretation of the regime to date has missed these important 
elements.  
 
Specifically, the thesis asks whether the contaminated land provisions impose 
stewardship obligations i.e. an obligation to manage land for the benefit of others, 
including for the benefit of future generations, onto the owner of land. There is no 
doubt that the focus of the regime is on the polluter pays principle, and the thesis 
does not deny this. Nor does it deny that the provisions are intended to bring a 
benefit now. What it does deny is that the polluter pays principle is the only 
background principle in play here and that the regime is looking to benefit only the 
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present generation. Instead, the principles of stewardship also form part of the 
underlying philosophy of the regime and it seems that the regime may operate more 
successfully if these features were fully recognised. The regime looks to landowners 
and it looks to the future, and it does so through the background principle of 
stewardship. 
 
This thesis attempts to demonstrate that stewardship principles are an important, but 
overlooked, aspect of the contaminated land regime by firstly looking at the 
contaminated land provisions in outline. This should allow an understanding of the 
overall operation of the regime and of where the owners of land fit into the picture. 
The thesis then justifies the focus of the paper and the motivation behind looking into 
the place of stewardship within the regime. From here, the meaning of stewardship is 
considered in some detail. This detail should allow the reader a much deeper 
understanding of what stewardship means, why it is relevant here, and what features 
of stewardship as an ethical and legal principle might form a part of the contaminated 
land provisions. Six hallmarks of stewardship can be gleaned from this discussion.  
 
The thesis then looks at the contaminated land provisions in relation to these 
hallmarks and reaches the conclusion that there are good reasons to believe that, in 
addition to the polluter pays principle, the contaminated land provisions rely on 
stewardship principles. This should greatly help interpretation of this regime, and the 
problems with interpretation and the potential solution posed by the conclusions of 
this thesis are then discussed. It is hoped that the conclusions posed in this thesis may 
suggest a different method of interpreting and applying this regime or elements of 
Emma Lochery 
090000290 
 
 
15 
the regime, such that what is currently underused legislation can begin to have a 
much more wide-ranging impact on the historical legacy of contaminated land. The 
regime is about polluters, but it is about landowners as well.  
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II: The contaminated land regime- an overview. 
 
Before assessing the regime, its aims, and its relationship with stewardship, it is 
necessary to give an outline indication as to the operation of the regime overall. The 
provisions relating to controlled waters and radioactive contamination will not be 
discussed independently here. The essential elements of the regime are to be found in 
Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA 1990) as amended by the 
Environment Act 1995, but the true operation of these provisions can only really be 
understood when the Contaminated Land (England) Regulations 2006 (S.I 
2006/1380)2- henceforth CL(E)R 2006- and most importantly, the statutory guidance 
in Circular 01/2006,3 are taken into account. The guidance must be considered by the 
enforcing authority, and as a result, it performs a very important role of fleshing out 
the relatively sparse provisions of the EPA 1990.4 The enforcing authorities in 
relation to contaminated land are local authorities and the Environment Agency.  
The current provisions were introduced in the Environment Act 1995 after the 
recognition of the failures of the previous proposed system which was to be 
introduced in 1991. Section 143 of the EPA 1990 made provision for the setting up 
of a register of sites which had been used for generally contaminating activities in the 
past. This was intended on the one hand to alert purchasers and developers to the 
possibility of contamination, and on the other to avoid excessive costs being placed 
                                                
2 This thesis will only consider the position in relation to England and Wales. The provisions of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA 1990) also apply in Scotland but there are different 
regulations and guidance.  
3 United Kingdom, DEFRA, “The Environmental Protection Act: Part IIA- Contaminated Land”, 
Circular 01/2006, (London: 2006). 
4 Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA 1990), Sections 78A(2), (5), (6); 78B(2); 78E(5); 78F(6); 
78P(2)(b); 78Q(6); and 78W.  
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on local authorities whilst preventing planning blight.5 It was however concluded 
that this system of registers would increase rather than decrease the potential for 
planning blight, and as a result, this option was abandoned. The Government then 
introduced new contaminated land provisions on the basis of the “Paying for Our 
Past”6 consultation document and the “Framework for Contaminated Land”7 paper.  
As of March 2007 this system had led to the total clean-up of 144 of 746 sites 
identified as being contaminated,8 with a further 35 sites9 designated as special 
sites.10 It is significant for the discussion that follows to note here that this clean-up 
has been achieved at an estimated cost of £55 million11 with only a fraction of this 
recovered from appropriate persons (in relation to only 86 sites were costs recovered 
and of these in only 26 sites was there potential for recovery from a Class B 
person).12 The system has thus proved expensive: perhaps, as will be argued here, it 
has proved more expensive for local authorities than the legislative provisions of the 
regime demand. The framework of this system outlined here. 
Local authorities are charged with inspecting land in their area in order to identify 
contaminated land.13  Land is contaminated where there is significant real or 
potential harm,14 or significant real or potential pollution of water.15 Harm16 is 
                                                
5 Stephen Tromans and Robert Turrall-Clarke, Contaminated Land (2nd Ed), (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2008) at 12. 
6 United Kingdom, Department of the Environment and Welsh Office, “Paying for Our Past”, 
(London: 1994). 
7 United Kingdom, Department of the Environment, “Framework for Contaminated Land: Outcome of 
the Government's Policies Review and Conclusions from the Consultation Paper Paying for our Past” 
(London, 1994). 
8 United Kingdom, Environment Agency, “Reporting the Evidence” (Bristol: 2009) at 3. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See page 19. 
11 Environment Agency, supra n8 at 19. 
12 Ibid at 21. 
13 EPA 1990 Section 78B(1).  
14 EPA 1990, Section 78A(2)(a). 
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defined in section 78A(4) EPA 1990 as, “harm to the health of living organisms or 
other interference with the ecological systems of which they form part and, in the 
case of man, includes harm to his property”.17 This terse definition is expanded in 
Part 3 of Annex 3 of Circular 01/2006. 
Harm will only be significant where the receptor, i.e. the living organism, ecosystem 
or property, is contained within Table A18 and also where the harm is the type of 
harm listed as being significant in that Table.19 For example, if the receptor is a 
human being, there will be significant harm if the substance in or under the land has 
led to, amongst other things, death, disease, or serious injury.20 There must be a 
relevant “pollutant linkage” which is either resulting in significant harm, or presents 
the possibility of such harm. The assessment of such a linkage must be based on 
scientific knowledge,21 rather than hypothetical risk, although the actual linkage need 
not be observable.22  
Table B23 specifies what conditions reveal a significant possibility of significant 
harm.24 In relation to human beings once again, there will be such a possibility of 
harm if the amount of pollutant that a human might take in would be regarded as 
‘unacceptable’.25 In order to make this assessment, the enforcing authority must rely 
on relevant information which is (a) scientifically-based; (b) authoritative; (c) 
                                                
15 EPA 1990, Section 78A(2)(b). 
16 See pages 104-108. 
17 EPA 1990 Section 78A(4). 
18 DEFRA, supra n3, Annex 3, Table A. 
19 See pages 104-108. 
20 DEFRA, supra n3, Annex 3, Table A. 
21 Ibid, Annex 3, Para A.15. 
22 Stephen Tromans and Robert Turrall-Clarke, Contaminated Land: The New Regime, (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at 19.  
23 DEFRA, supra n3, Annex 3, Table B. 
24 See pages 104-108. 
25 DEFRA, supra, n3 Annex 3, Table B. 
Emma Lochery 
090000290 
 
 
19 
relevant; and (d) appropriate.26 This assessment must be made with regards to the 
current use27 of the land and “the authority should disregard any receptors which are 
not likely to be present, given the ‘current use’ of the land or other land which might 
be affected”.28  
The local authority is not entitled to determine that a site subject, inter alia, to PPC,29 
waste management30 or a consent for a discharge into controlled waters is 
contaminated land.31 The local authority must determine whether a site should be 
designated as a ‘special site’.32 This designation will take place where the site falls 
under one of the criteria in regulation 2 of the CL(E)R 2006. Examples include land 
affecting controlled waters;33 land within a nuclear site;34 land owned or occupied by 
the Secretary of State for Defence or the armed forces;35 and land on which chemical 
or biological weapons have been manufactured.36 The consequence of such a 
designation is that the control of special sites is then left to the Environment 
Agency.37 The decision is made by the local authority, but the Environment Agency 
is entitled to inform the local authority of its belief that a site should be designated as 
a special site.38  
                                                
26 Ibid, Annex 3, Para A.31.  
27 See also pages 118-119. 
28 DEFRA, supra n3, Annex 3, Para A.25. 
29 Pollution Prevention and Control - now incorporated into the environmental permitting regime, 
Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, S.I. 2010/675. 
30 EPA 1990, Part 2. 
31 EPA 1990, Section 78YB. 
32 EPA 1990, Section 78C. 
33 CL(E)R 2006, Regulation 2(1)(a). 
34 CL(E)R 2006,  Regulation 2(1)(f). 
35 CL(E)R 2006, Regulation 2(1)(g). 
36 CL(E)R 2006, Regulation 2(1)(h). 
37 DEFRA, supra n3, Annex 2, Para 18.3. 
38 EPA 1990, Section 78C(4). 
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Once land has been identified as contaminated land, under section 78B(3), the 
enforcing authority, i.e. either the local authority or in the case of special sites, the 
Environment Agency, must give notice of the identification to anyone who appears 
to be an “appropriate person”, to the owner of the land and to occupiers.39 The 
enforcing authority must then require remediation of the contaminated land, as 
specified in section 78E and should serve a remediation notice on any “appropriate 
person”.40 If there is more than one “appropriate person”, then the remediation notice 
must specify the proportion of remediation for which each will be responsible.41 The 
CL(E)R 2006 give more detail on the content of the remediation notice.42  
The enforcing agency may only require by way of remediation that which, bearing in 
mind the costs involved and the seriousness of the harm or potential harm,43 it 
considers reasonable.44 The EPA 1990 does not provide extensive guidance on this 
point.45 Section 78E(4) EPA 1990 does specify that the remediation action must be 
reasonable, but the majority of the guidance is in Circular 01/200646 and over time 
the courts will begin to provide more assistance on what reasonable means here.47 In 
practical terms, a remediation notice can require the appropriate person to take steps 
for assessing the levels of contamination in the land;48 treating that contamination;49 
                                                
39 See page 23-24. 
40 EPA 1990, Section 78E(1). 
41 EPA 1990, Section 78E(3). 
42 CL(E)R 2006, Regulation 4. 
43 EPA 1990, Section 78E(4)(a) and (b). 
44 EPA 1990, Section 78E(4). 
45 For more information on the “reasonableness” standard, see page 114. 
46 Section 78E(5) EPA 1990. 
47 See R (On the application of Redland Minerals Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs, [2010] EWHC 913 (Admin), [2011] Env. L. R 2 where Sales J confirms that it is 
reasonable to demand remediation in the short term given the seriousness of the harm being caused 
even though there is little evidence over what a long-term approach to remediation might entail, at 
para 19-20 in particular. 
48 DEFRA, supra n3, Annex 3, Para C.65. 
49 Ibid, Annex 3, Para C.67. 
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and continuing to monitor the levels of contamination.50 The entire sequence of these 
actions is referred to in the guidance as the “remediation scheme”.51 Often the 
remediation required will involve disrupting the pathway between a source of 
contamination and the receptor being harmed or at risk of harm, and the removal of 
the source of contamination.  
The remediation notice must also be based on the standard of remediation that is to 
be reached under the regime.52 The standard to which land must be remediated is that 
the land be “suitable for use”.53 This is the standard which would be reached by 
using the “best practicable technique” (BPT) for remediation54 by removing or 
treating the pollutant, breaking or removing the pathway, and protecting or removing 
the receptor such that the land no longer meets the definition of contaminated land as 
outlined in section 78A under its current use. Current use is determined by the 
enforcing authority by reference to the planning permissions that exist over the land. 
The current use is any use which would be lawful under the current planning 
permission along with any likely informal recreational use of the land.55   
Best practicable technique for these purposes is defined in paragraph C.19 of the 
Circular.56 The enforcing authority is instructed to rely on authoritative scientific and 
technical advice in determining BPT.57 This approach is very reminiscent of the 
                                                
50 Ibid, Annex 3, Para C.68. 
51 Ibid, Annex 2, Para 6.3. 
52 See pages 117-119. 
53 DEFRA, supra n3, Annex 3, Para C.17.  
54 Ibid, Annex 3, Para C.18.  
55 Ibid, Annex 3, Para A.26. 
56 Ibid, Annex 3, Para C.19. 
57 Ibid, Annex 3, Para C.24. 
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much-criticised58 approach taken by the European Court of Justice in Pfizer59 which 
also requires that a decision-maker ought to rely on authoritative scientific evidence, 
but may not do so where there is reason to believe that caution may be required (the 
evidence of the need for caution ought however to be based on reasonable scientific 
advice). In short, the test for BPT risks either demanding too little by way of 
remediation since the evidence for greater intervention is not sufficiently conclusive, 
or relying on weak scientific evidence in order to allow more thorough remediation. 
Some more information on BPT was however provided in R (On the application of 
Redland Mineral Limited) v Secretary of State for the Environment and Rural Affairs 
where Sales J made it clear there that the urgency of need for remediation at least 
will be one consideration that goes into determining what is BPT.60 
Despite this, the evidence suggests that local authorities find this aspect of the regime 
easy to apply and helpful.61 The approach is also confirmed by the process advocated 
in para C.45 of DEFRA Circular 01/2006. This states: “[i]n some instances, there 
may be little firm information on which to assess particular remediation actions, 
packages or schemes… Where this is the case, the enforcing authority should 
consider the effectiveness and durability which it appears likely that any such action 
                                                
58 E.g. Caoimhin MacMaolain, “Using the precautionary principle to protect human health: Pfizer v 
Council” (2003) 28 European Law Review 723; Veerle Heyvaert, “Facing the consequences of the 
precautionary principle in European Community Law” (2006) 31 European Law Review 185; 
Elizabeth Fisher, “Opening Pandora’s Box: Contextualizing the Precautionary Principle in the 
European Union” accessed at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=956952 from Ellen 
Vos et al. (eds), Uncertain Risks Regulated: National, EU and International Regulatory Models 
Compared (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009). 
59 Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council of the European Union, T-13/99, [2002] ECR II-3305. 
60 R (On the application fo Redland Mineral Limited) v Secretary of State for the Environment and 
Rural Affairs, supra n47 at para 19. 
61 Environment Agency, supra n8 at 22 and Figure 13 page 23. 
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would achieve, and the practicability of its use, on the basis of information which it 
does have at that time”.62  
The actions required of the “appropriate person” to be carried out under a 
remediation notice can involve remediating land belonging to another. This means 
that the owner or occupier of that land for the time being will have to grant 
permission to the appropriate person,63 the enforcing authority, or contractors etc to 
enter into and carry out works upon their land. In order to ensure that the 
owner/occupier of the land does this, section 78G EPA 1990 mandates that such 
rights be granted. It does not impose a rule of ‘presumed grant’ but places an 
obligation on the owner or occupier of land to give the appropriate permissions.64 
The section also makes provision for compensation for the owner in having to grant 
such rights of entry etc,65 and requires that they be consulted before the remediation 
notice is served if such permission will be needed.66  
This begs the question as to who is the “appropriate person” on whom the enforcing 
authority must serve the remediation notice. Under section 78F EPA 1990 the 
“appropriate person” will primarily be the person who caused or knowingly 
permitted the substance in question to be in, under or on the land67 (Class A persons). 
If such a person cannot be found after reasonable enquiry, the owner or occupier of 
the land for the time being68 (Class B persons) will be the appropriate person. There 
can be more than one appropriate person. The enforcing agency, under section 78G 
                                                
62 DEFRA, supra n3, Annex 3, Para C.45. 
63 See also pages 111-113. 
64 EPA 1990, Section 78G(2). 
65 EPA 1990, Section 78G(5). 
66 EPA 1990, Section 78G(3). 
67 EPA 1990, Section 78F(2). 
68 EPA 1990, Section 78F(4).  
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EPA 1990, must use reasonable endeavours to consult every person who is the owner 
of occupier of the land and must also make reasonable endeavours to consult the 
person on whom the notice is to be served before the notice is served.69 This 
obligation does not apply where the enforcing authority considers that serious harm 
may result imminently if consultation were to take place.70  
Under section 78L EPA 1990 the person on whom a remediation notice is served 
may appeal against the notice within 21 days. This appeal will be made to the 
Magistrates’ Court if the notice was served by a local authority, and to the Secretary 
of State where the notice was served by the Environment Agency.71 The appellate 
authority must quash the notice if there is a material defect in it,72 but is authorised 
otherwise to confirm with or without modification, or to quash the notice. The 
grounds of appeal include a failure to take account of the guidance;73 that the land is 
unreasonably identified as being contaminated land;74 that the person is unreasonably 
identified as an “appropriate person”;75 that there was a failure to identify that 
another person was an “appropriate person”;76 and that the proportion of costs left to 
the person to bear was unreasonable.77 If an appeal is not successful, or if no appeal 
is brought, it will then become an offence for the person on whom the remediation 
notice is served to fail to comply with that notice.78  
                                                
69 See also pages 123-129. 
70 EPA 1990, Section 78G(4). 
71 EPA 1990, Section 78L(1). 
72 EPA 1990, Section 78L(2)(a).  
73 CL(E)R 2006, Regulation 7(1)(a)(i).  
74 CL(E)R 2006, Regulation7(1)(a)(ii).  
75 CL(E)R 2006, Regulation7(1)(c). 
76 CL(E)R 2006, Regulation 7(1)(d). 
77 CL(E)R 2006, Regulation 7(1)(f)(ii). 
78 EPA 1990, Section 78M. 
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The penalty for such a failure will be a fine.79 The enforcing authority can also bring 
High Court proceedings if it appears that the fine will be an insufficient sanction80 
and will not ensure that the remediation takes place.81 The remediation notice may 
contain within it continuing monitoring obligations as far as the initial pollution 
linkage is concerned, and remediation may take considerable time to complete. Once 
land is remediated, it is no longer considered to be contaminated land and the 
provisions of the regime no longer come into play in relation to that land. If there is a 
change of use however, the land may become contaminated again since new 
pathways or receptors may well be introduced onto the land as a result of the change 
in use.  
In practice the regime described here operates as a fallback provision for local 
authorities to rely on in cases where the landowner is not looking to change the use 
or develop his land. Local authorities tend to rely on other powers to ensure 
remediation, primarily through the planning system.82 Local authorities impose 
conditions of remediation onto developers when granting planning permission. By 
2007 local authorities had surveyed only an estimated 10% of their land at an 
estimated cost of £30 million.83 781 sites had been designated as contaminated with 
145 having been completely remediated by the time of the report.84 Additionally, 
local authorities have tended to avoid placing costs onto the owners of land (unless 
the owner is responsible for the contamination) and have instead paid for the 
                                                
79 Ibid. 
80 EPA 1990, Section 78M(5). 
81 See also page 132. 
82 Environment Agency, supra n8 at 6, Figure 1. See also United Kingdom, DEFRA, “Public 
Consultation on Changes to the Contaminated Land Regime under Part 2A of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990” (London, 2010) at paragraph 28. 
83 Environment Agency, supra n8 at 3. 
84 Ibid at 14. 
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remediation themselves. In England, full recovery from a Class B person was made 
in relation to only 5 sites, and in Wales no such total recovery from a Class B person 
has been reported.85 This has curtailed the ability of local authorities to tackle more 
sites.86  
The regime therefore appears slow, costly, and to have achieved little. Certainly 
there is some truth in this criticism,87 but, as this paper hopes to show, this lack of 
progress is partly due to the prevalence of voluntary remediation (which may of 
course be prompted by the existence of the regime88), but is also due to a 
misinterpretation of the regime. It is suggested that the regime does not need to be 
changed in order to achieve its aims more quickly and completely- it simply needs to 
be reinterpreted. As things stand, the liability of owners of land is not a practical 
reality. This does not need to be the case. 
                                                
85 Ibid at 21. 
86 See also pages 143-148. 
87 Stephen Vaughan, “The Contaminated Land Regime: Still Suitable for Use?” [2010] Journal of 
Planning Law 142 at 142.  
88 Ibid at 148. See also Michael Purdue, “The relationship between development control and specialist 
pollution controls: which is the tail and which is the dog?” [1999] Journal of Planning Law 585 at 
591. 
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III: Why Look at the Contaminated Land Regime from the Perspective of 
Stewardship? 
 
Before looking in more detail at the specifics of the contaminated land provisions 
and stewardship, it is necessary to demonstrate why it is worth looking at the regime 
in the light of stewardship at all. What is the link between the provisions and 
stewardship that justify the focus of this paper? Stewardship can be roughly 
described as being characterised by a responsibility to manage the state of land for 
the benefit, at least in part, of future generations. There are four key reasons why it is 
appropriate to consider the regime in relation to stewardship. Firstly, it is one of the 
expressed aims of the regime to manage the state of land for the benefit of future 
generations; secondly, the regime plays a specific function within the wider 
framework of regulation concerned with the state of land; thirdly, this is an element 
of land regulation which is often overlooked in literature discussing the place of 
stewardship within English law; and finally, the regime currently suffers for a lack of 
judicial guidance and interpretation and so it will be beneficial to have a guide to 
interpreting the regime provided by clarification of the background philosophy.  
(a) The aim of the regime 
 
The contaminated land regime, like most regulation, has a range of objectives. It 
aims to solve the historical problem of land contamination; to bring back into use 
land which is currently unusable; to ensure economically sustainable 
decontamination; and to manage the state of land for the future in conjunction with 
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other controls.89 DEFRA describes the main aim of the regime as being “to help 
address the problem of historical contamination of land and the risks it can pose to 
people’s health and the environment”.90 This paper will however focus on the final 
aim of improving the state of land for the future. This aim demonstrates that the 
contaminated land provisions are not simply focussed on solving this historical 
problem, but are instead looking to also manage the state of land for future 
generations by ensuring that we do not pass on land in the contaminated state in 
which we receive it.  
The contaminated land provisions were introduced on the back of a government 
consultation paper, “Paying for our Past”.91 The title alone indicates that the 
provisions were seen as not only as tackling historical pollution, but also as 
embodying a moral responsibility to make amends for the acts of previous 
generations. In fact, the consultation paper was launched as a response to the 
perceived short-comings in the system of registers that formed part of the EPA 
199092 and in the common law as exemplified by Cambridge Water Company v 
Eastern Counties Leather Plc.93 In this case Lord Goff highlighted the moral duty to 
clean up land. He argued that, “the protection and preservation of the environment is 
now perceived as being of crucial importance to the future of mankind”94 and 
                                                
89 United Kingdom, DEFRA, “The Environmental Protection Act: Part IIA- Contaminated Land”, 
Circular 01/2006, (London: 2006), Annex 1, Para 7. 
90 United Kingdom, DEFRA, “Guidance on the Legal Definition of Contaminated Land” (London: 
HMSO 2008) at Para 1. 
91 United Kingdom, Department of the Environment and Welsh Office, “Paying for Our Past” 
(London: 1994). 
92 For more information on the system of registers see pages 16-17. 
93 [1994] 2 A.C 264. 
94 [1994] 2 A.C. 264 at 305. 
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highlighted that the common law may not be able to adapt sufficiently to enforce the 
obligation. He called for legislation to step in to enforce this moral duty.95 
More than a duty to maintain the land, this moral responsibility is also an express 
responsibility to manage land. The landowner must go beyond maintenance to take 
active steps to ensure that his management meets his obligations. According to 
Goldstein, the steward is “not merely a caretaker”.96 One aim then of the provisions 
is to manage the state of land for the future. The justification for imposing such 
liability is phrased in terms of debts. The moral responsibility encapsulated in 
“Paying for our Past” was both the aim and justification for action.  
A similar tone is to be found in the statements made to the House of Commons by 
the sponsor of the Environment Bill. John Gummer,97 in two telling comments made 
on the 18th April 1995, argued: “[i]t is our responsibility not to lay similar costs on 
future generations if we are to proceed with the growth which all of us want to 
achieve today”,98 and again: “[t]hat is because we are concerned not just for this 
generation, but for future generations. Our concept [is] of continuity and of passing 
on to the next generation something better than we have received in the past”.99 The 
rhetoric of stewardship is used to explain and justify the imposition of liability.  
As a result, Class B persons, owners or occupiers of the land for the time being, who 
did not cause or knowingly permit a contaminating substance to enter onto or under 
the land, can, and arguably should, be held responsible for its clean up if the logic of 
                                                
95 Ibid. 
96 Robert J Goldstein, Ecology and Environmental Ethics: Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) at 96. 
97 The then Secretary of State for the Environment. 
98 John Gummer, House of Commons Hansard, 18/04/1995, Volume no. 258, Col 36. 
99 Ibid at Col 48. 
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this moral duty is pursued. The fact that this aspect of the regime is as yet underused 
does not alter the existence of the moral responsibility. The regime is presented in 
these statements as going beyond simply solving a practical problem of contaminated 
land. It is presented as being the embodiment of the obligation to develop with a 
view to the future. This is summed up on the DEFRA website: “The Government’s 
long-term aim is to work towards a future where all the contaminated land in 
England has been identified and dealt with”.100 
The Guidance too embodies elements of this idea of responsibility to manage land 
for current, and, crucially, future owners. “Contaminated land is an archetypal 
example of our failure in the past to move towards sustainable development. We 
must learn from that failure. The first priority for the Government’s policy on land 
contamination is therefore to prevent the creation of new contamination”.101 The 
second priority is to clean up the existing contamination.102 This ordering of 
priorities demonstrates that part of the philosophy of the regime lies in not causing 
any more problems for future generations and improving the current state of land for 
their benefit.  
Lee has argued that, “[c]ontaminated land is presented as predominantly a problem 
of historic pollution”.103 The guidance, she argues, demonstrates that the main aim is 
to address the problem of historical contamination and the risks this poses to human 
health. Whilst it is true that the target of the regulation will be land which is 
historically contaminated, this does not mean that the only aim of the regime is 
                                                
100 United Kingdom, DEFRA, viewed 23rd Sept. 2010 
<http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/land/contaminated/>.  
101 DEFRA, supra n89, Annex 1, Para 2. 
102 Ibid, Annex 1, Para 4. 
103 Maria Lee, “‘New’ environmental liabilities: the purpose and scope of the contaminated land 
regime and the Environmental Liability Directive” (2009) 11 Environmental Law Review 264 at 265. 
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simply to solve an old problem. It is also to solve this problem with a view to 
improving the state of land for the future as the Government’s ‘primary’ objectives 
identified by Lee demonstrate. These are: “(a) the identify and remove unacceptable 
risks to human health and the environment; (b) to seek to bring damaged land back 
into beneficial use; and (c) to seek to ensure that the cost burdens faced by 
individuals, companies and society as a whole are proportionate, manageable and 
economically sustainable”.104 The second of these goes to the temporal aims of the 
regime and it is clear that the aim is not simply one of bringing land into use for the 
present. The contaminated land provisions are not simply concerned that land is 
currently in an acceptable condition, although as has been admitted, this is the central 
focus of the regime. The regime is also concerned to ensure that future generations 
are not saddled with the problem of historical contamination. 
It is argued here that is important to discover whether this ‘moral responsibility’ to 
future generations, relied upon in the pre-legislation documentation, and the statutory 
guidance, is simply political rhetoric. It goes without saying that some of those 
involved in drafting the provisions may not have had “stewardship” explicitly in 
mind. The question is whether there is a genuine aim in this regime to look to the 
future.  
It is suggested that the answer to this question is to be found in the shape of the 
regime. The regime does not seek only to bring back into use land of which is of 
economic worth. The test for intervention is one of possibility of harm, not of the 
extent of the economic benefit that remediating the land would bring.105 The 
                                                
104 DEFRA, supra n89, Annex 1, Para 7 quoted in Maria Lee, supra n96 at 267. 
105 Ibid, Annex 3, Table A. 
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economic analysis that goes into the reasonableness of the remediation may take 
account of the benefit that remediation may bring, but the question is, at its heart, 
about whether it is reasonable to demand106 that the “appropriate person” carry out 
the particular steps involved in cleaning up the land, not whether this land should be 
remediated. There is no discretion on the enforcing authority over this latter question. 
There is an obligation on the enforcing authority that all contaminated land within 
the definition in section 78A(9) EPA 1990 be remediated.107  
Furthermore, the regime does not simply look to one moment in time, even though 
admittedly the regime’s primary focus is on the present. It does not ask only whether 
we need to clean up the land now, but also whether the land needs to be cleaned up 
for the benefit of the future. This, it is suggested, is enough to demonstrate that the 
references to the future are not simply rhetorical flourishes designed to make the 
ambitious108 aspects of the regime seem more palatable. The look to the future may 
be limited, but it is there, and this should be acknowledged. Examining how far the 
contaminated land provisions are able to meet this objective, whilst also being an 
enforceable and practical regime, is worthwhile. In turn this may tell us much about 
regulating on the basis of the principles of stewardship. Thus looking at the 
contaminated land provisions on the basis that the aim expressed to motivate their 
enactment is truly the aim of the provisions, is a useful exercise.  
(b) The place of the regime within the framework of “state of land” regulation 
 
                                                
106 See also page 114. 
107 EPA 1990, Section 78E.  
108 Maria Lee, supra n105 at 278.  
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The expressed aim of the regime does therefore justify the focus of this paper. 
Similarly, the function the regime performs explains why it is worth looking at the 
regime in the light of stewardship. The regime performs a critical role in ensuring 
that land is in an acceptable state for the future. There are two key objectives 
involved in ensuring this- the first (which is achieved through pollution controls109 
and waste management controls110) is that land is not made any ‘worse’. The second 
is that land which is currently polluted should be cleaned up.  
As the Environment Agency highlights, “[l]and affected by contamination can be a 
blight on communities and may present unacceptable risks to human health and the 
environment. Preventing our land becoming polluted is the best way of making sure 
that future generations do not inherit a legacy of contamination. However, today we 
all face the challenge of dealing with contamination caused by pollution in the 
past”.111 These planks are equally important. The contaminated land regime achieves 
this second aspect and “sweeps up harm unaddressed by other regulation”.112 When 
this is understood, it is no surprise that the regime asks whether land is contaminated 
now, in the present, since it is this land that must be cleaned up as part of this second 
plank. This focus on present contamination does not mean that the regime as a whole 
is not looking also to manage the state of land for the future. 
Crucially, it is in fact one of the few regimes that are proactive, rather than reactive, 
in performing this role and as such is central to the overall picture of state of land 
                                                
109 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010 S.I. 2010/675. See also, 
<http://ww2.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/permitting/> viewed 10/12/10. 
110 Waste Framework Directive, 2008/98/EC. See also, 
<http://ww2.defra.gov.uk/environment/economy/waste/> viewed 10/12/10 and Eloise Scotford, “The 
New Waste Directive - Trying to Do it All… An Early Assessment” (2009) 11 Environmental Law 
Review 75.  
111 United Kingdom, Environment Agency, “Reporting the Evidence” (Bristol: 2009) at 1. 
112 Maria Lee, supra n105 at 265. 
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regulation. (Statutory nuisance too imposes a proactive obligation on local 
authorities.113) Planning controls currently do account for the bulk of remediation of 
land (Lee highlights that the local authority estimate is that only 10% of 
contaminated land remediation is addressed under the EPA 1990)114 but whilst they 
are certainly a very important part of ensuring that land is cleaned up, they come into 
play only when a landowner is seeking to develop a parcel of land. Planning is a 
voluntary regime and as such operates very differently to the contaminated land 
provisions. The planning controls represent a compromise between the interests of 
the local authority and the developer. There is no power on the local authority to 
force the developer to remediate land if the developer simply accepts that he will not 
obtain planning permission.  
The contaminated land provisions can come into play not only where the owner of 
the land seeks to change its use or build upon it, but also where nothing happens to 
the land at all. They lie apart from planning controls. This is why the contaminated 
land provisions are so important and ambitious. They do not rely on the developer 
‘bringing the land to the attention’ of the local authority, nor do they rely on private 
individuals such as neighbours being affected by the state of the land, as in nuisance. 
Instead, they impose a duty on the local authority to inspect land, to find 
contaminated land, and to require its remediation. The contaminated land regime fills 
a crucial gap in ensuring that land is in a good state for future generations. 
                                                
113 EPA 1990, Section 79(1). 
114 Maria Lee, supra n105 at 276. 
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(c) State of the existing literature 
 
The third reason why it is appropriate to discuss stewardship in relation to 
contaminated land here is that this regulation has to date received little attention in 
the literature discussing the place of stewardship within English law. Specifically, 
although understandably given both their individual projects, and the date at which 
they were writing, neither Rodgers, nor Lucy and Mitchell, in their articles 
discussing stewardship in relation to environmental regulation in English law 
mention contaminated land. Rodgers looks primarily at the Countryside and Rights 
of Way Act 2000 (CROWA), the Wildlife Enhancement Scheme and the Rural 
Development Regulation when asking, “how do we characterize the nature of private 
property where environmental stewardship obligations have been imposed by 
modern environmental legislation”.115 This reflects his primary project of examining 
stewardship within the rural scene and agricultural regulation. In another article he 
looks too at the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, the Common Agricultural 
Policy, planning controls, and the position in relation to commons when examining 
the case for and practicality of introducing duties of environmental stewardship. It is 
especially interesting to note that in this article, Rodgers draws on the ‘suitable for 
use’ criterion which forms part of the contaminated land regime as a potential 
mechanism to “incorporate an explicit recognition of a basic responsibility of 
                                                
115 Christopher Rodgers, “Nature’s Place? Property Rights, Property Rules and Environmental 
Stewardship” (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 550 at 552.  
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environmental stewardship as an integral component of property entitlement rules at 
common law”.116 
Lucy and Mitchell by contrast look at sections 226-231 Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990, Airports Authority Act 1975, Civil Aviation Act 1982, Electricity Act 
1947, the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 and the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 as 
exemplifying restrictions on private property.117 Their article does not look 
specifically at environmental legislation and even if it did they were writing before 
the contaminated land provisions came into force.  Thus although the literature 
discussing the place of stewardship in English law contains discussion of many 
regimes, there is no discussion of the challenge to private property from regulatory 
intervention through the contaminated land provisions.  
It is suggested that this omission from the literature should be remedied. The 
contaminated land regime aims to achieve clean land for the future. Even if the 
contaminated land regime does not succeed in its aim, or if the inevitable 
compromises that arise through the necessity of drafting regulations in a certain and 
enforceable manner override the aims of stewardship, there is benefit in looking at 
stewardship and the contaminated land regime in conjunction. The exercise, it is 
hoped, will reveal something about contaminated land and something about 
regulating on the basis of principles of stewardship. This paper does not attempt to 
argue that stewardship is a better way to regulate land use. Rather it comes from the 
point of view that recognizing that stewardship underlies the contaminated land 
                                                
116 Christopher Rogers, “Property rights, land use and the rural environment: A case for reform” 
(2009) 26S Land Use Policy S134 at S139. 
117 William Lucy and Catherine Mitchell, “Replacing Private Property: the Case for Stewardship” 
(1996) 55 Cambridge Law Journal 566 at 571-572. 
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regime allows a better understanding of the complexities within the provisions and of 
why the regime is drafted as it is. 
(d) The current approach to interpretation and application 
 
Finally then it is important from a practical perspective also to determine what the 
underlying philosophy behind the regime is. The reason for this is that the regime 
suffers from a lack of guidance on how to interpret and apply it. The official 
published guidance does help in this regard, but local authorities struggle with the 
regime118 and there are very few judicial decisions to assist them although some 
recent decisions have provided more guidance on the regime in practice.119 At the 
time of Vaughan’s survey, only three decisions on the regime had reached the higher 
courts.120  
Today the number is five but these cases have tended to be narrow in their focus with 
few judicial comments on the wider regime and its place within the framework of 
state of land legislation. As Vaughan comments, “The lack of engagement with Pt 
2A by the House of Lords in the National Grid Gas decision and by the High Court 
in Circular Facilities has meant that we have little in way of clear judicial guidance 
on certain of the key terms used in the regime”.121 It is suggested that an examination 
                                                
118 Environment Agency, supra n111.  
119 R. (on the application of Redland Minerals Ltd) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs [2010] EWHC 913 (Admin); [2011] Env. L.R. 2; R. (on the application of Crest 
Nicholson Residential Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, [2010] 
EWHC 561 (Admin); [2011] Env. L. R. 1.  
120 Stephen Vaughan, “The Contaminated Land Regime- Still Suitable for Use?” [2010] Journal of 
Planning Law 142 at 148. 
121 Ibid at 154. 
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of the underlying philosophy and aim of the regime, and an explanation of why 
certain features of the regime as are they are, will be practically useful.122  
Furthermore, in both National Grid Gas123 and Circular Facilities124 the main 
question asked was concerned with the liability of potential Class A persons. The 
approaches in the two cases can however be contrasted in terms of their overall 
approach to the regime. National Grid Gas, as will be seen in detail below, was 
concerned not to extend liability as a Class A person to statutory successors to the 
original polluter. This conclusion was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to 
ensure that shareholders in such companies were not saddled with the costs of 
liability. Circular Facilities, by contrast, suggests scope for a broader approach when 
attributing knowledge to a person to bring them within the scope of the Class A test. 
Although the case is at its heart about interpretation of evidence it does acknowledge 
that the key problem here is attempting to assess facts that arose 20 years before but 
that the key question is simply whether the person knew of the existence of the 
contaminating substance and did nothing about it- not whether he knew that harm 
was or may be caused by this substance.125  
Whilst there is no doubt that the key difference between the two cases is one of the 
question being asked, and both do share a strict interpretation of the language of the 
provisions, there does seem to be some conflict between their approaches to the 
polluter pays principle, what it means, and how it fits into this regime. It 
demonstrates a lack of clear engagement with the underlying principles that go into 
                                                
122 See pages 143-148. 
123 R (National Grid Gas) v Environment Agency [2007] UKHL 30, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1780. 
124 Circular Facilities (London) Ltd v Sevenoaks DC [2005] EWHC 865, [2005] Env. L.R. 35. 
125 Ibid at para 43. 
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this regime and as such demonstrate the wider need for further engagement with the 
philosophy behind its enactment. Whilst this thesis does not address the 
interpretation of the polluter pays principle directly, the lack of consistency in the 
underlying policies behind the regime is the central theme of this paper. The courts 
are not engaging with the regime and so it is difficult to interpret it as effectively as 
possible. It is hoped that the interpretation of the regime advocated here will assist 
the courts in applying the regime. 
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IV: What is stewardship? 
 
Stewardship is both an ethical concept126 and a legal principle. The relationship 
between the ethical concept and the legal one is complex. In law, the steward started 
life as a land agent,127 although the principles of the ethical concept of stewardship 
are represented in many legal systems.128 As an ethical concept it has a number of 
justifications,129 and, of course, the precise meaning to be attributed to stewardship 
will depend on which justification is adopted. This paper will begin by examining the 
ethical concept since this allows a deeper understanding of the meaning of 
stewardship. There will then be a detailed discussion of the role of stewardship in 
law, and how it interacts in law with other, perhaps more familiar, concepts. It will 
be possible to distil from this discussion a number of ‘hallmarks of stewardship’. 
These characteristics will be the elements that form legal regulation based on a 
principle of stewardship. 
(a) Stewardship as an ethical principle 
 
As an ethical principle, stewardship has a long history, and it is therefore difficult to 
generalise about its meaning. Despite this, this paper will attempt to outline a 
relatively uncontroversial definition of stewardship and will look at environmental 
stewardship in particular. It will then briefly outline the different justifications for the 
                                                
126 Lynton K Caldwell, “Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use? - The Need for a New Conceptual 
Basis for Land Use Policy” (1973-1974) 15 William and Mary Law Review 759 at 767.  
127 See pages 65-67. 
128 See pages 65-68. 
129 See pages 46-58. 
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stewardship ethic in order to explore more fully how we ought to understand 
stewardship.  
(1) Definition of the ethical principle of stewardship 
(a) Stewardship generally 
As highlighted above, it is difficult to set out an uncontroversial definition of 
stewardship as an ethical principle. The main problem lies in giving enough content 
to the principle to make it a meaningful guide to conduct whilst remaining 
sufficiently general. The definition given by Welchman demonstrates this problem. 
“To be a steward is to devote a substantial percentage of one’s thoughts and efforts 
to maintaining or enhancing the condition of some thing(s) or person(s), not 
primarily for the steward’s own sake”.130 This definition attempts to state the general 
thrust of stewardship, but fails to highlight what is distinctive about stewardship as 
an ethical principle. It is not simply that the steward will act with something in mind 
other than his own interests, but that the steward will also be answerable (or in some 
versions, accountable) for his actions in “maintaining or enhancing” the thing.  
Stewardship must contain within it some notion of enforceable responsibility, be 
that, in secular versions of the principle, accountability to the people or state, or in 
non-secular versions, to God. It is only by acknowledging that the true steward must 
justify himself to others that the operation of stewardship can be understood. In the 
non-secular stewardship model, man, as a whole, and each person individually, is 
responsible to God for their actions as steward. Attfield highlights that, “[w]hatever 
our laws may say about property… humans do not own the Earth… but hold or 
                                                
130 Jennifer Welchman, “The Virtues of Stewardship” (1999) 21 Environmental Ethics 411 at 415.  
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possess [it] on a provisional basis hence their answerability”.131 It is this 
answerability in Attfield’s account that is the essence of stewardship. 
In secular versions too the steward is accountable and will be responsible to the state, 
the people generally, or to a specific person for their actions. This is an essential 
element of stewardship and one which forms a very important aspect of the argument 
presented here.132 Attfield highlights the accountability of the steward, not only to 
religious stewardship, but also to secular stewardship.133 Stewardship entails 
answerability precisely because the owner of property is not able to use this property 
in any way he desires. The key to a trust is the enforceability of the trust obligation, 
the duty to account. The same can be said for stewardship. This analogy between the 
trust and stewardship will be discussed in more detail below,134 but in terms of the 
definition of stewardship it is enough to note that the analogy brings us as far as 
allowing us to conclude that as with the trust, there should be some duty to account 
as part of the notion of stewardship. For this reason the definition given by 
Welchman will be adapted here to include this element of sanction for the moral 
failure to comply with the obligations of stewardship. A steward must manage or 
enhance something for someone or something else and will be answerable for any 
failure to do so. As will become apparent, this definition also links very closely with 
how stewardship has developed as a legal principle. 
(b) Environmental stewardship 
                                                
131 Robin Attfield, The Ethics of the Global Environment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999) at 45. 
132 For more detail on the answerability aspect of the ethical principle of stewardship see 61-65. 
133 Robin Attfield, supra n131 at 45. 
134 See pages 69-71. 
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There are considered to be different strands of stewardship as an ethical concept- 
agricultural stewardship, stewardship of historical and cultural artefacts, and more 
crucially for our purposes, environmental stewardship. Although each of these 
focuses on the key idea of an obligation to manage for the benefit of others, the 
content of the obligation will vary from context to context. In addition, the ‘others’ 
for whom one must manage the property will also vary depending on the strand of 
stewardship being examined. This paper is concerned with environmental 
stewardship, which is widely accepted as being one of the key ethical motivations 
behind protection of the environment.135  
A useful definition with which to commence our discussion is that adopted by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency. “We define environmental 
stewardship as the responsibility for environmental quality shared by all those whose 
actions affect the environment… It is also a behavior, one demonstrated through 
continuous improvement of environmental performance, and a commitment to 
efficient use of natural resources, protection of ecosystems, and, where applicable, 
ensuring a baseline of compliance with environmental requirements”.136 This 
definition is useful because it is relatively specific and highlights a number of 
important features of environmental stewardship. This definition, although detailed, 
fails however to mention the aspect of answerability outlined above, missing one of 
the crucial aspects of stewardship.  
                                                
135 Christopher Barrett and Ray Grizzle, “A Holistic Approach to Sustainability Based on Pluralism 
Stewardship” (1999) 21 Environmental Ethics 23 at 35. 
136 United States, Environmental Protection Agency, “Everyday choices: Opportunities for 
Environmental Stewardship” (Washington: 2005) at 2. 
Emma Lochery 
090000290 
 
 
44 
It does however emphasise an important issue regarding environmental stewardship. 
The term “stewardship” describes responsibilities and the behaviour of the steward 
when meeting his responsibilities. The principle of stewardship is a guide to 
behaviour- it tells us how we should behave. In addition, it is used to describe our 
behaviour when we do act in this way. As a result, when examining discussions of 
stewardship, it is important always to distinguish between the norm, “one should 
behave according to the principle of stewardship” and the description, “he is 
behaving as a steward”. This distinction is crucial when asking the question, “who is 
the steward” since this could mean either, “who should act according to the 
principles of stewardship” and “who is acting according to these principles”. This 
paper will focus on the first sense. This is really the core meaning of stewardship. 
Stewardship is an ethical principle that dictates appropriate forms of conduct. 
Stewardship is the responsibility to act for the benefit of something or someone else 
when managing natural resources with some kind of sanction when the responsibility 
is not complied with. Our definition of environmental stewardship then is a 
definition of what the ethical principle of stewardship demands in relation to the 
environment. 
This definition raises the question as to what obligations this responsibility entails. 
We know that stewardship requires management of property for the benefit of others, 
but we must ask, firstly, what is meant by the management of property in this 
context, and secondly, who the “others” are. These two issues really must be 
addressed together in order to determine what obligations would be characteristic of 
a system of stewardship. Lucy and Mitchell describe “the hallmark of stewardship 
[as] land holding subject to responsibilities of careful use, rather than extensive 
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rights to exclude, control and alienate that are characteristic of private property”.137 
They therefore focus on the notion of careful use. Caldwell describes an additional 
element which is essential to a stewardship system: “ownership or possession of land 
is viewed as a trust, with attendant obligations to future generations as well as to the 
present”.138  
The obligation is therefore not only to use the land carefully, but also to manage the 
land with a view to benefitting future generations, even where this conflicts with the 
steward’s present needs. Lucy and Mitchell, in not relying on the interests of future 
generations in their definition, may well avoid some of the difficulties of regulating 
on the basis of stewardship which are discussed below,139 but their account, as with 
Welchman140, fails to demonstrate what is distinctive about stewardship. It is the 
mixture of right and obligation with a view to the future that is central to the notion 
of environmental stewardship. Stewardship is about more than ensuring that the 
earth’s resources are not depleted- it is also about ensuring that land is in a certain 
state and as such can be used to tackle pollution and contamination, as well as 
overuse. In order to understand this general definition more fully it is necessary to 
examine the justifications said to be behind this ethical principle. Why is there an 
obligation to manage property for the benefit of future generations? 
(2) Justifications for the ethical principle of stewardship  
 
                                                
137 William Lucy and Catherine Mitchell, “Replacing Private Property- the Case for Stewardship” 
(1996) 55 Cambridge Law Journal 566 at 584. 
138 Lynton K Caldwell, supra n126 at 766. For more on the relationship between stewardship and 
trusts see pages 69-71. 
139 See pages 134-142. 
140 See page 41 and n130.  
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There are many potential justifications for the ethic of stewardship, and these 
justifications can lead to conflicting formulations of the content of the obligation. 
This paper will discuss some of these different justifications, not to determine which 
is the most coherent or satisfactory in terms of explaining stewardship, but in order 
to try to highlight some common features which allows us to adopt a general 
definition of stewardship. This approach, like that of Barrett and Grizzle141, is 
pluralistic, and demonstrates that it is possible to believe that stewardship as a guide 
to conduct can be justified without fully committing oneself to one particular strand 
of justification. This is not to say that any of the justifications given are perfect, nor 
is there space here to fully convince that stewardship is indeed justified. Instead, it 
will be shown that there are some potentially strong justifications for stewardship, 
certainly enough to allow us to proceed. The justifications examined here will be, 
firstly, secular justifications based on ideas of justice and ecology, and then, 
secondly, religious justifications. This discussion will attempt to show that the 
definition of stewardship adopted here is sufficiently general to allow those of many 
different perspectives to acknowledge that we should act according to this principle. 
 
(a) Intergenerational Justice 
Firstly, many see stewardship as based on the moral duties associated with 
intergenerational equity. Brown Weiss takes this approach arguing that, “[a]s 
members of the present generation, we hold the earth in trust for future generations. 
At the same time, we are beneficiaries entitled to use and benefit from it”.142 Attfield 
                                                
141 Christopher Barrett and Ray Grizzle, supra n135. 
142 Edith Brown Weiss, “Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment” 
(1990) 84 American Journal of International Law 198 at 199. See also pages 69-71. 
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too relies on an intergenerational justification for stewardship, but gives more details 
as to the content of the resulting obligations. “Current agents, to the extent that they 
have the necessary powers and resources, have obligations to provide for the 
satisfaction of the basic needs of future generations, and to facilitate the development 
in the future of characteristic human capacities… that such satisfactions and 
development can foreseeably be facilitated”.143  
He argues that the ethical justification for the principle “supplies a substantive 
content to trusteeship”.144 The obligation that he thus associates with 
intergenerational justice is an obligation not only to allow the basic needs of future 
generations to flourish, i.e. through permitting food production and maintaining 
water supplies, but also to develop distinctively human characteristics. Arguably this 
implies that the stewardship duty could include maintaining the aesthetic value of 
areas of natural beauty to promote artistic and literary endeavours, or the protection 
of buildings of special historical value to promote learning.  
Brown Weiss too advocates this approach as it allows a wealth and depth of cultural 
and ecological heritage.145 She outlines three principles of intergenerational justice 
which support the principles of stewardship. Firstly, each generation will fall under 
an obligation to preserve the “diversity of the natural and cultural resource base”;146 
secondly, each generation must keep the planet in a good state such that it is passed 
on in “no worse a condition than that in which it was received”;147 and thirdly, each 
generation must ensure that future generations have access to the “legacy of past 
                                                
143 Robin Attfield, supra n131 at 157. 
144 Ibid at 162.  
145 Edith Brown Weiss, supra n142 at 202. 
146 Ibid at 201-202. 
147 Ibid at 202. 
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generations”.148 The scope of this definition of intergenerational justice, and of the 
stewardship obligation that it engenders, are wider than environmental protection, 
and extends into a justification for preservation of the total range of sensory and 
intellectual sources that each generation has the privilege to enjoy. It includes within 
it a crucial focus on the state of the planet and its resources. In short, each generation 
must manage its resources in such a way that will not harm or prevent the flourishing 
of, future generations. 
This definition of intergenerational justice demonstrates why this is the predominant 
secular justification for environmental stewardship. According to Rawls, “the correct 
principle is that which the members of any generation (and so all generations) would 
adopt as the one their generation is to follow and as the principle they would want 
preceding generations to have followed (and later generations to follow), no matter 
how far back (or forward) in time”.149 Stewardship which concerns itself with 
management of natural resources fits into this pattern of acting from the ‘position of 
ignorance’.  
This Rawlsian understanding of justice does however seem to ignore the potential 
ecological, rather than anthropological, benefits of stewardship. This is a popular 
comment on the stewardship approach that relies on Rawls. Barry for example sees 
“long-sighted anthropocentrism [as]… a key aspect of ecological stewardship”.150  
Goldstein too focuses on the anthropocentric moral justification for the principle: 
“[s]tewardship is about benefitting society, but it includes future generations within 
                                                
148 Ibid. 
149 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition (Chichester: Columbia University Press, 
2005) at 274. 
150 John Barry, Rethinking Green Politics (London: Sage Publications, 1999) at 152. 
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that zone of protection”.151 These views exclude the protection of natural interests for 
their own sake. 
This focus on the needs and wants of man has often been used as a criticism of 
stewardship.152 Even from a purely anthropocentric perspective however there are 
difficulties with the approach which looks to the balance of rights and obligations 
between generations and whilst it is not possible to examine the nature of this 
controversy in detail here, it is necessary to outline the difficulties with an 
“intergenerational justice” explanation of stewardship. There is considerable 
controversy, despite the fact that the justification for stewardship is the promotion of 
the interests of future human beings, as to whether future generations are in fact 
capable of holding ‘rights’ which are enforced through these obligations.153 This 
difficulty is significant for the question of the nature of the obligation that rests on 
the steward. It will be seen below that it is perhaps not necessary to ‘ground’ 
obligations in a corresponding right.154 Here, this paper will not attempt to prove that 
future generations can have rights, but simply to suggest some answers to this 
difficulty.  
It certainly is problematic to state that future generations have rights in the present 
since they do not yet exist nor can we know who or how many will make up the sum 
of these future generations. This argument is often presented as a stumbling block to 
                                                
151 Robert J Goldstein, Ecology and Environmental Ethics: Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) at 96.  
152 Robin Attfield, supra n131, Chapter 3. 
153 Lukas Meyer, “Intergenerational Justice” viewed 28th Sept. 2010 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-intergenerational/>. 
154 See also pages 109-121. 
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our having obligations owed to future generations.155 Thus White presents the 
argument that, “it is... a fallacy to argue, as is commonly done, that because a certain 
class of things, whether… the environment… generations yet to come… is capable 
of having, or actually has something in its interests, therefore it is capable of having 
a right”.156 Interests, he highlights, are not enough to ground rights.  
There are however answers to this problem. Firstly it is possible to conclude, as 
White does, that interests are neither sufficient nor necessary to the founding of 
rights: persons, he argues, whether born or not, are capable of having rights simply 
by virtue of their being persons.157 Similarly, Warren, when discussing the rights of 
persons who will never be born, discusses the position in relation to future 
generations and concludes that “to say that merely potential people are not the sort of 
things which can possible have moral rights is by no means to imply that we can 
have no obligations toward people of future generations, or that they (will) have no 
rights that can be violated by things which we do now”158 precisely because as fellow 
human beings we should treat them as we would want to be treated.  
The second potential solution to this difficulty is suggested by Hoerster. He argues 
that “we can safely assume, first, that future people will be bearers of rights in the 
future, second, that the rights they have will be determined by the interests they have 
then, and third, that our present actions and policies can affect their interests. If we 
can violate a person's rights by frustrating her interests severely, and if we can so 
                                                
155 Richard De George, “The Environment, Rights, and Future Generations” and Ruth Macklin, “Can 
Future Generations be Said to Have Rights” both in Ernest Partridge, Responsibilities to Future 
Generations: Environmental Ethics (New York: Prometheus Books, 1981) cited in Lukas Meyer 
supra n142. 
156 Alan R White, Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984) at 80. 
157 Ibid at 90. 
158 Mary Anne Warren, “Do Potential People Have Moral Rights” (1977) 7 Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 275 at 288. 
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severely frustrate such interests of future people, we can violate their future 
rights”.159 As a result it is theoretically possible to ground an obligation (the 
corollary of a right160 under some characterisations of obligation161) in the notion of 
intergenerational justice. If either of these explanations can ground rights in future 
generations, then we can conclude that this could give rise to a corresponding 
obligation on us.162 It is not necessary however to conclude that this is possible, as 
will be seen below,163 in order to justify the stewardship obligation, even one based 
on intergenerational justice. This is because obligations need not necessarily be 
grounded in rights.164 The argument presented here, i.e. that future generations do 
have rights, is however a justification for the ensuing obligation. The content and 
nature of this obligation is discussed below.165 
(b) Ecocentric and ecological justifications 
Stewardship is also seen as being linked with the principles of ecology, despite the 
focus on human interest apparent in theories of intergenerational equity. Goldstein 
argues that stewardship “gives us a legally cognizable obligation, based on ecology 
and interpreted using the principles of environmental ethics”.166 The ethics of 
ecology stipulate that the natural world should be seen as a single system within 
which one interference can have wide and unexpected consequences. For this reason, 
many of those of a ‘deep green’ or ecocentric perspective advance the principles of 
                                                
159 Paraphrased by Lukas Meyer, supra n153. 
160 Wesley N Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1913) 23 
Yale Law Journal 16. 
161 See pages 109-121. 
162 Edith Brown Weiss, supra n142 at 201. 
163 See pages 109-121. 
164 Ibid. 
165 See pages 109-121. 
166 Robert J Goldstein, supra n151 at 95. 
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stewardship, not as a matter of intergenerational equity, but as a means of promoting 
ecological principles. As Caldwell makes clear however stewardship can only 
promote ecological principles where it is accompanied with a change in social 
behaviour and understandings of man’s relationship with nature.167 It is this aspect of 
stewardship that draws many tribal cultures to it e.g. American Indian and Aboriginal 
culture.168 Buddhism also places value on ecological awareness169 and stewardship 
for ecocentric, as opposed to anthropocentric reasons. 
Difficult as it is to ground rights in future generations on the basis of 
intergenerational equity however it seems even more problematic to found an 
obligation on an individual person to behave according to the principles of 
stewardship on the basis of ‘rights’ of an ecosystem or a species. This paper is not 
the place to discuss the ability of animals and plants to hold rights,170 but even if 
such rights are logically possible, the adoption of a wholly ecocentric approach to 
stewardship must result in serious consequences for the type of ensuing obligation.  
It is suggested here however that it is not necessary to adopt a wholly anthropocentric 
view in order to allow the relevant rights to be vested in future generations. In the 
same way that parents have rights for the benefit of their children, and trustees have 
rights for the benefit of the beneficiary, it is suggested that future generations can be 
                                                
167 Lynton K Caldwell, “Land and the Law: Problems in Legal Philosophy” [1986] University Illinois 
Law Review 319 at 334. 
168 Jim Poulter, “The Secret of Dreaming,” [Aboriginal folktale] viewed 28th Sept. 2010 
<http://learningtogive.org/resources/folktales/SecretOfDreaming.asp>.  
169 “The Brave Little Parrot,” [traditional Jakartan story] viewed 28th Sept. 2010 
<http://www.healingstory.org/treasure/little_parrot/brave_little_parrot.html>. 
170 For more information on this topic see: Anthony J. Povilitis, “On Assigning Rights to Animals and 
Nature” (1980) 2 Environmental Ethics 67; and Richard A Watson, “Self-consciousness and the 
Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature” (1979) 1 Environmental Ethics 99; Charles Hartshorne, 
“The Rights of the Subhuman World” (1979) 1 Environmental Ethics  49. Christopher Stone’s article, 
“Should Trees Have Standing?: Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects” [1972] Southern 
California LR 450 is also informative in this regard. 
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the holders of rights that the current generation act according to the principles of 
stewardship, both for their own benefit, and for the benefit of the natural world. This 
allows us to take a middle course between a wholly anthropocentric and a wholly 
ecocentric approach.  It allows a recognition that both man and nature can be 
benefitted if stewardship is adopted given its anthropocentric and ecocentric secular 
justifications.  
(c) Judeo-Christian Stewardship 
There is also widespread non-secular justification for stewardship. It has very strong 
ties with both Judeo-Christian171 and Islamic culture. Christian and Jewish 
philosophies draw on, amongst other texts,172 Genesis: “[t]he Lord God took the man 
and put him in the garden of Eden to work it and keep it”.173 This viewpoint sees 
man as unique in being able to protect other parts of the ecosystem. With this ability 
comes responsibility to ensure that man does not exploit the Earth, but instead 
maintains it and keeps it on behalf of God. As with the secular justification of 
intergenerational justice, many have argued that this attitude, of man as dominant 
over nature, tends to sacrifice nature to man’s will rather than imposing a duty to 
protect it.174 Brennon and Lo argue however that “[t]he Judeo-Christian tradition of 
thought about nature, despite being predominantly “despotic”, contained resources 
                                                
171 John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature 2nd Ed. (London: Duckworth, 1980). 
172 Psalm 148, Leviticus 25. 
173 Genesis, 2:15, English Standard Version, 
<http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+2&version=ESV> viewed 3rd Dec 2010. 
174 For example, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1976); Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” 
(1967) 155 Science 1205; John Black, The Dominion of Man (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1970). See also John L Paterson, “Conceptualising Stewardship in Agriculture within the Christian 
Tradition” (2003) 25 Environmental Ethics 43 at 44 and footnote 6. 
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for regarding humans as “stewards” or “perfectors” of God's creation”.175 The United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops176 agrees with this, describing man’s 
stewardship of land as being about thoughtful rather than selfish management.177 
Not only is there a strong philosophical justification for stewardship founded in these 
religions, there is also a strong link between the Judeo-Christian concept of 
stewardship and the legal principle. It is perhaps unsurprising that the links between 
them are so close since the two grew up side by side in early legal systems. This can 
be seen in Leviticus 25:23: “The land shall not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is 
mine. For you are strangers and sojourners with me. And in all the country you 
possess, you shall allow a redemption of the land”.178 The reference here to tenancy 
demonstrates the links between the ethical and legal principle. At the time of the Old 
Testament, a steward was generally a manager for another, usually a Royal 
personage.179 It seems then that not only is there a Judeo-Christian justification for 
the principles of stewardship, these religions have also helped to shape the content of 
the legal forms of the principle.  
(d) Islamic Stewardship 
Islamic philosophy on stewardship also sees the world as belonging to God with man 
accountable for its upkeep.180 An example of this is the Islamic law rule of “himas” 
                                                
175 Andrew Brennon and Yeuk-Sze Lo, “Environmental Ethics,” 2008, 28th Sept. 2010 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/>  
See also Lloyd Steffen, “In Defense of Dominion” (1992) 14 Environmental Ethics 63. 
176 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Renewing the Earth” 1991, Part 1 Para C. 
177 See also The General Synod Board for Social Responsibility of the Church of England, “Christians 
and the Environment” quoted in Robin Attfield, supra n131 at 48. 
178 Leviticus 25:23, English Standard Version 
<http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Leviticus+25&version=ESV> viewed 3rd Dec 2010. 
179 John L Paterson, supra n174 at 49. 
180 Robin Attfield, supra n131 at p53.  
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which involves the protection of specified areas of land from overuse. This rule is 
being used today in Islamic cultures to advocate a stewardship approach to 
environmental protection:181 “[t]he overall goal of the Hima revival is to mesh 
traditional practices with recent conservation science as a way to reach sustainable 
development”.182 This attitude is a reflection of the teachings of the Qur’an, which 
states: “I am setting on the earth a vice-regent”.183 This is not to say of course, either 
in relation to Islam, nor the Jewish and Christian faiths, that there is a prevailing 
opinion that man is steward of the earth amongst followers of the faiths. Rather the 
purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate that the principle does at least find 
support in these religious texts such that it is possible to draw on the relationship 
between man and the Deity in order to justify stewardship.  
(e) The success of and interaction between these justifications 
There is therefore a series of strong justifications for stewardship. As was 
highlighted above, there are flaws in these justifications and each may not be capable 
of justifying stewardship but there is not space here to defend each of the 
justifications against possible criticisms. Instead, it is hoped that the discussion here 
has shown enough at least to suggest that the stewardship obligation is potentially 
justifiable. This paper is not the place to attempt to outline a definitive ‘justification’ 
for stewardship. It has been argued at least however that the anthropocentric and 
ecocentric views can to an extent be reconciled.184 Barrett and Grizzle describe the 
                                                
181 Richard Foltz, “Is There an Islamic Environmentalism?”  (2000) 22 Environmental Ethics 63 at 64. 
See also, Iqtidar H. Zaidi, “On the Ethics of Man’s Interaction with the Environment: An Islamic 
Approach” (1981) 3 Environmental Ethics 35. 
182 The Society for the Protection of Nature in Lebanon viewed 30th Sept. 2010 
<http://www.spnl.org/load.php?page=hima_history>.  
183 Qur’an 2:30, translation taken from Richard Foltz, supra n170 at 64. 
184 Christopher Barrett and Ray Grizzle, supra n135. 
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pitting of ecocentrism against anthropocentrism as unnecessary.185  It is not possible 
to draw all these justificatory threads together in limited space, but what can be said 
clearly is that the justification for stewardship broadly relies on the fact that man 
ought to manage natural resources, be this for his own benefit, for the benefit of 
nature, or in order to fulfill his obligations to God. As a result environmental 
stewardship must at least aim to protect and manage the state of land and must do so 
for the benefit of the future.  
Neither an ecocentric nor an anthropocentric justification for stewardship can 
perhaps fully account for the obligations that arise through stewardship, and 
reconciling them in the way suggested here does not necessarily solve this problem. 
Thus an anthropocentric approach does not demand that a land owner manage his 
land in order to ensure a range of ecological habitats where the species that 
subsequently flourish do not give rise to any identifiable benefit to man. Conversely, 
stewardship obligations do not necessarily demand that the interests of nature are 
treated equally with the interests of man such that the obligation can be justified by 
deep green principles. This is not to say that stewardship obligations cannot be 
justified, but that ‘stewardship’ as a concept is sufficiently broad to cover the 
obligation that results when one of these perspectives is adopted. Ecological 
justifications cannot explain the full range of potential stewardship obligations, and 
nor can anthropological justifications. But this does not mean that a stewardship 
obligation cannot be justified, and that its content cannot be linked to its justification. 
As a result, it is necessary to choose, to some extent, which aspect of stewardship to 
prioritise. The explanation of the various justifications for stewardship simply helps 
                                                
185 Ibid at 35. 
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us to understand the content and shape of the relevant obligations and why they 
might arise. 
For the purposes of this paper then it will be assumed that at least part of the interests 
of the future that will be protected are the interests of future man. This approach is 
also adopted by Barrett and Grizzle who specify that, “we subscribe to the weak 
anthropocentric view that although humans are not exclusively valuable, as implied 
by strong anthropocentrism, neither are they of equal value with all other species, as 
suggested by biocentrists”.186 As a result, the assumption as to benefitting future man 
here will allow us to ground rights in future generations. Even from an ecocentric 
perspective, it is possible to act for the benefit of man (although not man alone) since 
the human race does form part of the ecosystem. It will also be possible to grant 
rights to man in order to protect nature since only man has the abilities to act 
consciously to protect the ecosystem. By granting rights to future generations187 that 
the ecosystem be protected, the obligation on current generations becomes 
enforceable. As a result of this, the steward must keep in mind the needs of future 
generations when making decisions over the future of his land and it is this aspect of 
stewardship that this thesis suggests lies at the core of the idea.  
These justifications therefore suggest not only that stewardship as an ethical 
principle can be justified, but also get to the heart of what this principle is about. This 
paper will look at some questions relating to the nature of the ethical principle of 
stewardship in order to determine its content and nature more fully, before moving 
onto the principle in law.  
                                                
186 Ibid at 36. 
187 See also pages 49-51. 
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(3) Is stewardship an end in itself or a means to an end?  
 
Whilst it has become apparent that stewardship can be justified, we must ask whether 
it is necessary to go beyond ensuring that the underlying justifications are met. That 
is, is it enough simply that man behaves ethically, or ought we to frame our 
stewardship obligations in such a way as to ensure that the ‘justification’ is actually 
met, rather than simply the good of complying with the ethical principle? Can we 
comply with the ethical principle of stewardship without actually achieving the goals 
behind the principle? This has important implications, as will be seen, for the nature 
of the legal principle of stewardship.188 
It can be argued that a legal system might decide to rely on a stewardship system of 
property in order to ensure the protection of natural resources,189 sustainable 
development,190 or good ecological practice. Frazier for example argues that property 
rules should be used to find a balance within the environment with a focus on 
ecology.191 But there are other ways to ensure these outcomes without relying on a 
system of stewardship even though stewardship may be morally ‘good’. There must 
therefore be some value in taking the stewardship approach, even if the ‘aims’ of 
stewardship can be achieved in other ways and indeed if complying with the 
stewardship obligation does not in fact lead to greater justice between generations, 
                                                
188 See pages 65-99. 
189 Christopher Rodgers, “Nature’s Place? Property rights, property rules and environmental 
stewardship” (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 550. 
190 James P Karp, “A Private Property Duty of Stewardship: Changing our Land Ethic” 23 
Environmental Law 735 (1993) at 735, abstract. 
191 Terry W Frazier, “The Green Alternative to Classical Liberal Property Theory” (1995-1996) 20 
Vermont Law Review 299. 
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protection of the environment for its own sake, or protection of the planet as 
representatives of God. 
It can be seen as valuable in itself that land is viewed as a continuing commodity 
which is intimately connected with the fate of future generations such that there is a 
duty on us to ensure that these generations are taken into account when decisions are 
made as to the fate of land. In Frazier’s words, “ecology’s emphasis on 
interdependence provides a scientific and moral basis for defining our responsibility 
to society with respect to property ownership”.192 As a result of our unique ability to 
control the biosphere, arguments from the perspective of ecological justice demand 
that we take account of the needs of future generations and least pass on the planet in 
no worse a condition than we receive it.193 This does not tell us however that these 
needs should be the ‘trump card’ outweighing the needs of the current generations 
regardless of other factors or why the change of attitudes required for stewardship to 
become prevalent cannot simply be by-passed by the passing of strict regulatory 
standards through command and control legislation.  
This thesis does not attempt to justify legislation on the basis of stewardship, nor to 
advocate this approach. It simply seeks to ask whether the contaminated land regime 
does in fact take this approach. The relationship between stewardship attitudes and a 
command and control approach must however be addressed. The key to stewardship 
is that the decision-maker has in mind the interests of the future and that he is 
accountable or answerable for his decisions on this basis. A command and control 
approach which sets the ‘outcome’ of the decision in advance would perhaps not 
                                                
192 Ibid at 319. 
193 Edith Brown Weiss, “The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity” (1983-
1984) 11 Ecology L.Q. 495 at 498-499.  
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encourage the development of a stewardship attitude and as such would not impose a 
system of stewardship even if the standards set are intended to benefit the future or to 
promote sound ecological practice etc.194 
The key to ascertaining which of these approaches is in play in a particular 
circumstance lies in the decision-making process and it is this process that is so 
central to the ethical principle of stewardship. The decision must be left to the 
steward (and as we have seen, he will be accountable for any failure to comply with 
his obligations in making this decision195). The means by which he manages his land 
is a matter for him. If the means he adopts do not in fact promote the interests of 
future generations, or if it is demonstrable that in the course of his decision-making 
process he did not take account of these interests, then he will be answerable for this 
failure. It is his decision however how far to promote the interests of the future above 
the interests of the present.  
It seems then that whilst the stewardship principle will affect decision-making, it 
does not in itself always tell us what the correct decision will be. To use a 
hypothetical example from a situation of contaminated land, the steward may have to 
decide between a costly but speedy clean up, and a cheaper but slower method. By 
employing either of these methods he will manage the state of the land for the benefit 
of future generations. This is exactly what he intends to do. Would a system of 
stewardship dictate between these two options? Stewardship would not tell us which 
option was better in and of itself. The justifications behind stewardship might help, 
but this means considering more than simply the obligation to make decisions to 
                                                
194 Welchman describes the appropriate attitude that stewards must hold. Jennifer Welchman, supra 
n130 at 415ff. 
195 See also pages 61-65 and 74-80. 
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manage land in accordance with the interests of the future. The reason for this is that 
simply stating that we should act for the benefit of the future does not tell us to what 
extent the needs of the present generation should be ignored where two possible 
routes will lead to the same benefit for the future.  
As a result it is possible to argue that stewardship is linked to a more decentralised 
mode of decision-making.196 As Attfield highlights, “depicting humanity as in a 
position of trust with respect to nature does not involve understanding society or 
government as either undemocratic or unrepresentative; if anything it commends 
democratic debate, so that the members of society can jointly discover or decide how 
to exercise their role”.197 The adoption of the attitude of stewardship as a legal 
principle has benefits beyond the effects that it has in improving the state of land for 
the future, or maintaining a healthy ecosystem etc. It is said to change the method of 
decision-making within a local or national area. When ascertaining whether the 
contaminated land provisions impose stewardship obligations then we must ask not 
only whether they mean that land is managed for the benefit of future generations, 
but also whether they encourage and allow the development of the attitude of 
stewardship and the decision-making processes associated with stewardship. 
(4) Breach of the moral obligation to act according to the principles of stewardship. 
 
Thus although there is perhaps not one single justification that explains the 
stewardship obligation, it has been demonstrated that if stewardship is indeed 
justifiable, the obligation that arises is one which is of value in and of itself, rather 
                                                
196 The Duthchas Project, “Act Local: Community Planning for Sustainable Development. The 
Duthchas Handbook” (Inverness, June 2001). 
197 Robin Attfield, supra n131 at 49. 
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than simply being a means to an end. It remains to be seen however what, if any, 
sanction applies if there is a breach of this moral obligation since this would help 
explain the accountability aspect of stewardship which, as will be seen below, is so 
central to the legal principle of stewardship.198 What happens when you are a bad 
steward?  This thesis does not attempt to provide a conclusive answer to this 
question, but simply to point out some possible sanctions in order to shed light on 
stewardship as a legal principle.  
There are at least two types of sanction that may be imposed on a ‘bad steward’. 
Firstly, there is the sanction of condemnation- be that, according to a religious 
understanding of stewardship,199 a sanction imposed by God, or in a secular 
understanding,200 condemnation by the community of which an individual is part. 
Secondly, there is a more complex type of sanction that arises as a result of failure to 
confer a benefit on oneself. The steward will be a member of a generation benefitted 
by the imposition of stewardship obligations onto those in a position to make 
decisions about the state of land.201 By failing to comply with the stewardship 
obligations that fall on him, he acts on his land in such a way that is detrimental to 
himself as a member of the wider land community. These potential sanctions will be 
explained in turn although it should be understood that failure to comply with 
stewardship obligations could lead to both sanctions arising.  
Firstly there is the sanction of condemnation by others. This sanction is often used to 
explain the motivation behind compliance with a rule. Hart, for example, makes clear 
                                                
198 See pages 74-80. 
199 See pages 53-55. 
200 See pages 46-53. 
201 This approach, outlined by Tony Honoré in “Groups, Laws and Obedience” in Making Law Bind 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) owes much to Rawls’ approach to intergenerational justice. For more 
on this see above pages 48-51 and n149.  
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that rule breaking justifies “hostile reactions”202 and as such can be seen as a reason 
why people follow moral, and indeed legal, rules. As Green highlights, “the normal 
function of sanctions… is to reinforce duties”.203 It is clear however that this sort of 
sanction is not necessary in order for the rule itself to be valid.204 Thus the rule can 
exist even if there is no moral condemnation for its breach. There may be many 
reasons why there is no sanction for any particular breach- impossibility of discovery 
of the breach; any explanation for the breach lessening the moral condemnation 
attached to the breach; or indeed simply ambivalence or forgiveness in those who 
would normally supply the condemnation (i.e. the citizenry, or the Deity). Whilst 
none of these factors means that there would never be a sanction for breach, they do 
mean that sometimes there would be no sanction and yet there is no doubt that the 
rule would still exist.  
There are two ways out of this difficulty. The first is to suggest that what matters for 
stewardship is not that there would be a sanction if the obligation was breached, but 
that there could be. There must be at least the potential for accountability. The 
second explanation is that the moral stewardship obligation would only exist as long 
as there was no systematic ambivalence towards the breach. If there was a common 
attitude that breach of the obligation would not justify condemning the person who 
committed that breach, the rule would, in effect, no longer be a rule of the particular 
system or group.205 As a result, it seems, there must be at least the potential of social 
                                                
202 Herbert L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 82 quoted in 
Andrei Marmor, “The Nature of Law” visited 11th February 2011, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-nature/.  
203 Leslie Green, “Legal Obligation and Authority” visited 11th February 2011, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation/.   
204 The example given by Leslie Green is the duty of the highest court to apply the law. Ibid. 
205 Tony Honoré, supra n201 at 39. 
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condemnation in order for us to conclude that there is a moral obligation to comply 
with the requirements of stewardship.  
The other possible source of such a sanction arises as a result of the fact that, in 
addition to being subject to the responsibilities of stewardship, a steward, is a 
member of a generation in theory benefitted by the duties of stewardship.206 By 
failing to comply with his own stewardship obligations, he risks his being a 
beneficiary of the obligation in others. In brief, he makes it less likely that others will 
also comply with their stewardship obligations. This will impose a sanction on him 
because he will not thereby be benefitted by others complying with their obligations. 
Here by breaching the stewardship obligation, the steward no longer ensures that his 
and other land is in a good state for his own future use. He does this because there is 
a risk that the rule is no longer effective as Honoré outlines.207 He thus loses a 
benefit himself in prioritising his short-term ambitions, or laziness etc over his long-
term needs as a human being and member of the land community.208 
 As a result, we can see that even if there is no mechanism or means of social 
condemnation in a particular case for breach of the moral stewardship obligation, 
there is another sanction in the form of a potential failure to benefit. This goes into 
explaining why the legal principle of stewardship entails mechanisms for 
accountability. For a breach of the moral obligation of stewardship a steward will be 
accountable to God, to society, or to himself. The transformation of this into a legal 
rule has implications for the types of sanction that exist and explain why it is that the 
                                                
206 See pages 46-51. 
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208 For more on the concept of land community see pages 77-80. 
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mechanism for accountability that forms part of the contaminated land provisions is a 
part of the overall picture of the place of stewardship within the regime.209  
(b) Stewardship as a legal principle 
 
Having discussed the ethical background to the principle, this paper will now 
examine the nature of stewardship as a legal principle and in doing so to begin to 
outline the hallmarks of stewardship to be discussed later. How has this principle 
manifested itself in law to date and what are the characteristics of a legal system 
based on the principles of stewardship? As with the ethical principle, the meaning of 
the legal principle varies hugely according to context and there is little consensus 
over what it means,210 even within one context. There are two key strands of 
stewardship that will be discussed here.  
The first is the “steward” as warden of a house, i.e. the literal translation of the word 
steward from waerd (warden) and stig (house).211 This extends into the figure of the 
steward as the agent or land manager for the existing owner of the land.212 He was 
the “arch-administrator of the lay estate”.213 Swett succinctly outlines his role: “The 
steward was his lord's agent, paid to serve his interests, please him, and protect his 
property”.214 This principle looks at stewards as acting for the benefit of another, but 
for the present only, not for the future (unlike the ethical principle outlined above). 
This form of stewardship, as Denman makes clear, was a question of administration 
                                                
209 See pages 76-80. 
210 William Lucy and Catherine Mitchell, supra n137 at 584. 
211 John. L. Paterson, supra n174 at 50. 
212 Robert. C. Stacey, “Agricultural Investment and the Management of the Royal Demesne Manors, 
1236-1240” (1986) 46 The Journal of Economic History 919. 
213 Donald R Denman, Origins of Ownership (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958) at 116. 
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rather than morality and is not the focus of this paper. The steward here acts as an 
agent for the principal landowner. He is not bound by obligations of stewardship, but 
must act for the benefit of the principal by virtue of his acting as agent. 
The second strand is the steward as the trustee for the unidentified or future owner of 
land. The second strand can be seen in Scottish clan structures with the chief of the 
clan for the time being charged with improving the land for the good of the clan for 
now and in the future. The concept of dùthchas, or trusteeship, highlighted this duty 
on the part of the clans to maintain the stock of their property.215 This duty “had no 
force in law, [but] nevertheless had the force of custom behind it”216 and as 
Dodgshon highlights, the boundary between law and custom at this point in Scottish 
history was difficult to draw.217 In terms of accountability, the clan chief would be 
accountable to his clan members, and in practice a clan chief who did not act in 
accordance with this principle would struggle to maintain the allegiance of his 
extended family group. 
Certainly it is known that consenting to a clan’s eviction from the land amounted to a 
breach of the duties associated with the duthchas and alienation of the totally of the 
land too would constitute such a breach.218 The role of each individual tenant farmer 
was as maintainer and manager of the land for the benefit of the clan as a whole, both 
for now and in the future. The notion of stewardship underpinned Highland land 
holding until the demise of the clan structures. In fact, Hunter argues that it was the 
abandonment (an abandonment strengthened perhaps by the advent of land 
                                                
215 Allan I Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788 (East Linton: 
Tuckwell Press, 1996) at 3 and 5-6. 
216 Robert A Dodgshon, Land and Society in Early Scotland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) at 110. 
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registration) of this concept of land-holding that prompted the demise of the clan 
structure: “all concept of the kindred’s interest in the land was consequently cast 
aside, while the encouragement thus given to former chiefs to become landlords on 
the southern model virtually shattered the already weakening paternal affection 
which the traditional chief had felt for his clan”.219  
This concept was however again used in 1998-2001 in Scottish Highland 
communities to encourage sustainable development and management.220 The 
philosophy of the clan structure may not have entirely left the Highlands. Many 
landholders today still see their role as maintaining and improving their land for the 
benefit of their children. There is of course a difference in seeing yourself as acting 
for the benefit of your direct family and for the benefit of the land community as a 
whole, but the notion that land should be preserved for future generations is at the 
heart of both attitudes.  These attitudes tend to lead to stewardship behaviour, even if 
there is no legal obligation to behave this way. What we can derive from the 
Highland example however is that the legal obligation (if we can take this to have 
been at least quasi-legal) was to manage the land for the benefit of the present and 
future clan, and the clan chief could be held accountable for the mismanagement of 
the land. Both of these aspects will form part of the hallmarks of a system based on 
stewardship. 
These two strands then have existed in property regulation in the United Kingdom, 
and they were very influential until the advent of the strong liberal concept of 
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property rights that coincided with industrialisation. It might even be said that 
‘stewardship’ in some form or other has been the norm for legal regulation of land in 
the UK through history. The reality is, however, that today stewardship is not the 
prevalent accepted method of land holding. If the contaminated land provisions are 
an example of regulation on the basis of stewardship, they will today be relatively 
unusual. 
Some legal systems have however relied on stewardship to a much greater extent, 
and a further aspect of stewardship is also arguably prevalent in the Roman law of 
usufruct. Although the ‘steward’ in this case was only entitled to use the land and 
never came into ownership of it as such, the extent of his rights can be compared to 
the rights and duties of the feudal tenant.221 Whilst the usufructuary had the right to 
take the fruits of the thing,222 he had to maintain it and make no alterations to the 
object of the usufruct.223 The standard of care in the usufruct was that of the bonus 
paterfamilias. This standard, i.e. that expected of a good head of a family, ties in 
with the notion of the usufructuary as a quasi-steward: he was expected to maintain 
the property with which he was entrusted to the standard that a person maintaining 
his property for the benefit of his family and its future and he was accountable to the 
bare owner if he failed to do so.224 
As a general outline then, stewardship as a background principle in legal regulation 
generally demands that the owner of property use and manage that property for the 
benefit of something or someone else, but also allows the owner to do so. As Brown 
                                                
221 John W Cairns, “Craig, Cujas, and the Definition of feudum: Is a Feu a Usufruct?” in Peter Birks 
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Weiss argues, “[e]ach generation is thus both a trustee for the planet with obligations 
to care for it and a beneficiary with rights to use it”.225 The steward is the beneficiary 
of rights and is burdened with obligations, a characterisation which is central to our 
later discussion. He is above all a decision-maker directed to take into account 
certain considerations whether he is charged with acting for the benefit of the future, 
or for the benefit of his principal and it is these features that appear in the examples 
of stewardship as a legal concept discussed here.  
This analogy with a trust from Brown Weiss is important and deserves greater 
attention here since it is both instructive, and limited. Brown Weiss suggests that we 
should regulate our relationship with the planet through a “planetary trust” which is 
akin to a charitable trust of the sort found in Anglo-American trust law.226 Although 
Brown Weiss argues that the resulting concept is still a trust,227 it is suggested here 
that what she describes is not a trust, but is stewardship, and that the differences she 
highlights between “the planetary trust” and a charitable trust are the differences 
between trusts and the notion of stewardship. Firstly she highlights that trusts have a 
moment of creation: they are established as a result of an act, be that deliberate or 
unknowingly.228 They do not just exist as the obligation to act as a steward could be 
said to exist. Of course, as Brown Weiss herself highlights “while no affirmative 
action need to be taken to create the planetary trust as a moral obligation, to have 
legal force it must be effectuated by positive law”.229 This does not mean however 
that the stewardship is created by an active step on the part of the steward, nor can it 
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be so created. Rather it is an obligation that forms part and parcel of the ability to 
make decisions about land.  
Secondly, fiduciary duties as understood in Anglo-American trust law have detailed 
rules relating to value and ensuring the financial integrity of the trust.230 There is no 
such fiduciary duty associated with stewardship. Instead, the provisions relate to a 
specific aspect of maintenance of the property- i.e. ensuring the land is in a particular 
state- rather than ensuring that the property keeps its financial value. Furthermore, 
the trustee in a traditional trust is able to sell the relevant property and allow the 
equitable interests in that to be overreached such that the beneficiaries’ interest no 
longer rests in the original property.231 This is not the case with stewardship since the 
interest of future generations in the land will remain regardless of any sale etc. Thus 
not only are the duties associated with stewardship different to those seen in a 
traditional trust situation, they also interact with the property in a different way. 
A third and much more fundamental difference is the beneficiary of the trust and of 
the stewardship obligation. With a trust, even a charitable trust, the class of 
beneficiaries is limited. With the stewardship obligation this is not the case. The 
beneficiaries are all those in the land community,232 i.e. all those who rely on the 
land for survival. That is, at the very least, all humans are beneficiaries of the 
stewardship obligation (animals may also be such beneficiaries but the controversy 
over the ability of animals to hold rights, which is not discussed here, is enough to 
make one pause rather than committing to animals being beneficiaries of this 
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obligation233). Furthermore, the trustee of a trust will not always be a beneficiary of 
that trust, and in the case of a charitable trust he will not be, at least not ‘with his 
trustee hat on’. By contrast, with stewardship, the steward as steward is necessarily 
also a beneficiary. The role of beneficiary and steward are inextricable. There are 
therefore crucial differences between the trust and stewardship although the analogy 
is an instructive one.234 
Both concepts, as Welchman highlighted,235 ask the steward to act for the benefit of 
something or someone other than themselves. There is no doubt that the 
contaminated land regime does demand this of landowners. It is suggested however 
that it goes further than this. It not only reflects a legal principle of one acting for the 
benefit of another, but also imbues this legal principle with the ethical foundation 
behind it, i.e. it ask the steward to act for the benefit of future generations and also 
represents the necessary aspect of answerability. In order to demonstrate this, the 
paper will now begin to look at some particular aspects of stewardship as a legal 
principle in order to be able to distil from the discussion some of the hallmarks of 
such a regime. 
(1) Is a steward primarily a duty-bearer or a rights holder?  
 
This question gets to the heart of what role a legal system would assign to a person 
acting as steward and to what extent he is made accountable for breach of any duties 
associated with his stewardship role. In order to determine this, it is necessary to 
understand more about the interaction between the steward’s property rights in the 
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land and his obligations that derive from his role as steward. Once this is understood, 
it is possible to examine, firstly, the content of the obligation in more detail, and then 
secondly, the rights required in order to be a steward.  
Lucy and Mitchell argue that the steward is primarily a duty-bearer.236 Although he 
holds rights, the raison d’être for the steward is as someone who ensures that the 
property is maintained for the benefit of future generations. The effect that this 
would have on our analysis is that we would have to conclude that the steward’s 
primary role was as ‘guardian’ of his land. A distinction is drawn with the 
usufructuary for whom the raison d’être for his rights in the land is to benefit 
himself- to use the land and take the fruits- not to benefit future owners.237 As a 
result, although he must maintain the land and ensure that the overall resource level 
on the land is not diminished over the duration of his rights, the essence of the 
usufructuary is that he is a rights holder.  
Lucy and Mitchell argue that steward, on the other hand, is only given rights as a 
means to allow him to perform his duties as a steward.238 Whilst it is true that the 
steward is obliged, it is impossible to get away from the fact that he must have rights 
in the land concerned, and, most importantly, that we may only conclude that it is 
just to make him responsible for managing the land because he has rights to enjoy 
that land. It is also logical that an individual could become owner before he becomes 
a steward. There is no necessity that an owner of land be burdened with stewardship 
obligations- this is a choice for a legal system to make. For this reason, the rights 
associated with ownership can be separated from stewardship which is a package of 
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duties imposed onto his rights. It is therefore not possible to see the steward as 
largely or solely a duty-bearer.  
Neither however should we conclude that as a result of being the person entitled to 
use and manage the land the role of the steward is primarily as someone who holds 
rights over land. He is more than this precisely because he is the steward. The 
dichotomy between rights-holder and duty-bearer is circular: it is simply two sides of 
the same coin. The rights that the steward has over land, to enjoy it himself, and to 
make use of the land in such a way that manages it for the benefit of the present and 
the future, are critical to his ability to be steward. It is for this reason that the test for 
who is the steward below relies on having rights over land.239 To be a steward one 
must have both duties and rights.  
There is then another way of characterizing the essence of the steward. The steward 
is the person most entitled to manage the land in question:240 he is the decision-
maker in relation to that land.241 Having the decision-maker over the future of land 
burdened with obligations when making their decisions is a hallmark of a system 
based on stewardship. This is not often acknowledged in the literature, but it is 
argued here that this role is what is most crucial about the steward. The steward’s 
rights in relation to the land can be exercised by him, but must be exercised in such a 
way as to comply with his obligation to manage the land for the benefit of future 
generations, as well as for his own benefit and for the benefit of other members of 
the current generation.  
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It is actually this aspect of stewardship which causes some from an ecocentric 
perspective to reject stewardship since they argue that it implies that man has 
dominion over nature if he is entitled to take decisions over its future.242 Palmer for 
example argues that stewardship symbolises despotism, and this is precisely because 
the steward has such a central role as decision-maker.243 Attfield rejects this 
argument, stating that a steward, whilst being a decision-maker, is subordinate in 
many ways to those whose interests his is charged with serving, in the manner of a 
trustee and his beneficiary.244 It is this subordination that leads to the answerability 
for the steward. This complex relationship, of decision-maker and beneficiary, and of 
answerability, is a more accurate representation of the role of the steward than one 
which focuses on dominion. 
The steward’s decision-making is restricted and guided by the obligations that fall on 
him and his rights facilitate it. He is the primary decision-maker in reference to the 
land and becomes part of the land community245 as a result of this. This means that 
he becomes part of the community of landowners who as a whole are obliged to act 
in furtherance of their stewardship obligations. By his membership of that 
community he also becomes a beneficiary of the ensuing approach to the 
management of land. Attfield outlines how a stewardship obligation ‘owed’ for 
future generations must operate in practice and it is clear that in his model the 
‘proxies’ (i.e. those who become the individual representatives of future generations- 
in our model, the owner of the land and the steward) would become primary 
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decision-makers answerable to “as representative a body as could be devised, granted 
the nature of the interests in question”.246 Thus not only is the steward a decision-
maker, he is a decision-maker who will be accountable to the state under a legal 
system that is based on stewardship as part of the land community. His 
accountability is a hallmark of stewardship, and the existence of the ensuing land 
community explains why the state ought to be the body that carries out this task of 
calling stewards to account. 
The role assigned to the steward as individual representative of the future 
generations, is a complex, and at times apparently a contradictory one. He is not 
simply a servant of future generations; he is also at times their mouthpiece in the 
decision- a decision for which he will be answerable. He is the initial arbiter of what 
happens to the land at the present time, but he is also the arbiter of what characterises 
the interests of the future generations. Is it possible to be both? It is submitted that it 
is possible to in this sense represent the future generations, because he is part of the 
intergenerational community discussed here. If we take the idea that as a result of his 
role as a member of the land community he is able to assess what might be in the 
interests of future generations, it makes perfect sense for him to then make his 
decision on this basis. This decision will of course be potentially subject to review 
and in this review the state will act as proxy247 to represent the interests of future 
generations - but he is able to both decide their fate and decide the interests of the 
future generations with which his stewardship obligation is concerned. 
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It is this central role in the fate of the land which is key to the notion of the steward. 
In this sense he is neither primarily a rights-holder nor a duty-bearer, but he is, by 
virtue of his rights and the obligations attached to the exercise of those rights, a 
decision-maker. Demsezt describes the position of private property where the owner 
of the land acts as a broker taking into account competing claims of the present and 
the future. He argues that: “future generations might desire to pay present 
generations enough to change the present intensity of land usage. But they have no 
living agent to place their claims on the market”.248 The steward, it is submitted, 
must act as this living agent and act on the basis of uncertain or unknowable 
information. This fact should colour every aspect of a system of stewardship. The 
position of the steward is summarised by Attfield: “stewards can be curators, 
trustees, guardians and wardens”.249 Each of these persons is a decision-maker. 
In his role as decision-maker however there is no doubt that in order for stewardship 
to function as a legal principle the steward must be accountable. This accountability 
can be explained in a number of ways. The first explanation arises from the fact that 
the legal principle is grounded in morality. It was argued above that the moral 
principle entails sanction for breach.250  The legal principle would also contain such a 
sanction. Unlike with the moral principle however, the nature of legal norms is such 
that the sanction would not be imposed by the steward upon himself, or even by a 
Deity, but by the community of which he forms part, i.e. the state. This sanction 
would of course not always be applied, but the possibility of such a sanction is 
central to the concept of stewardship as a legal principle.  
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This can be seen if we look at Frazier’s concept of the land community and its 
relationship with Honoré’s discussion of the relationship between groups and legal 
rules. Our starting point is that by becoming a steward, through his ability to make 
decisions over the future of land, the steward becomes a member of the land 
community, that is, he is obliged by the rules of that community and benefits from 
others’ compliance with those rules. This community is a legal community. 
Membership of this community is part and parcel of becoming a steward. In 
Honoré’s language, the notion of stewardship is the “shared understanding” which 
defines the group, but this group can only exist as long as “the prescriptions to which 
the understandings related [are] broadly... effective”.251 In other words, the group 
understanding that land owners will comply with the requirements of stewardship 
will only define the group as long as the obligations are enforced. The land 
community can only exist as long as the obligations of stewardship are effective and 
since the land community forms a necessary part of the notion of stewardship, the 
disintegration of the group would mark the end of the legal principle of steward. The 
two notions are mutually reinforcing. As a result, the stewardship obligation must be 
to at least some extent upheld by the group- “there must be a substantial measure of 
compliance”.252 
In addition to the existence of the group however, as Honoré makes clear, the group 
relationship is necessary to the existence of the legal obligation per se.253 This goes 
beyond the continuation of the land community, and into the continued existence of 
the law following the disintegration of the community: “all law is the law of a group 
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of individuals or of groups made up of individuals. No one can make a law purely for 
himself… The existence of a group is therefore a necessary and arguably a sufficient 
condition of the existence of laws or something like them”.254 Therefore, not only is 
the continued enforcement of the rule holding the group together necessary for the 
continued existence of the group, i.e. the land community, and the mutuality of 
benefit and burden associated with that group, it is also necessary for the continued 
bindingness of the rules associated with the group- in this case, the obligations of 
stewardship. 
There is also another potential explanation of the need for enforcement, and thus 
mechanisms for accountability, of the obligations of stewardship and this comes 
from the analogy drawn by Brown Weiss with the trust mechanism.255 Although 
Brown Weiss argues that the sorts of obligations we are discussing here are trust 
obligations, this paper suggests that the divergence from these rules outlined by 
Brown Weiss are significant enough to mean that, contrary to her argument, the 
‘planetary trust’ is not a trust at all, but simply something like a trust.256 Here the 
planetary trust is the notion of stewardship which although not a trust has similarities 
with a trust. Crucially however these differences do not prevent the parallel being 
drawn between a trust and stewardship in terms of accountability. The essence of a 
trust relationship is that the trustee is to be held accountable to his beneficiary for 
any failure to comply with his duties.  
By analogy it can be argued that part of the essence of a stewardship obligation is 
that the steward is accountable to his “beneficiaries” for any such failure. The 
                                                
254 Ibid. 
255 Edith Brown Weiss, supra n193 at 503. 
256 See pages 61-65. 
Emma Lochery 
090000290 
 
 
79 
difficulty with this is that the land community to which the steward is accountable 
exists across generations. This means that the trust must be enforced, as with 
charitable trusts, through the use of the state as proxy. This explains not only why 
there must be accountability mechanisms in place, but also why it is appropriate for 
the state to be responsible for such calling to account. It is not argued here that the 
state is the only potential proxy; it is equally possible to suggest that an independent 
charity or body should call land owners to account. It is argued only that the state can 
act as such a proxy. The reason why the state is able to act this way is because of its 
continuity and its role as link between various generations. The state also has the 
resources and knowledge to be able to act as proxy, and thus to ensure that the 
steward is made accountable as if he were a trustee.  
Thus accountability can be seen to form a part of the notion of stewardship as a legal 
principle and although the steward is accountable to other members of the land 
community, this accountability is enforced by the state as proxy. The consequences 
of being called to account for failure to comply with the duties of steward should be 
a sanction strong enough to ensure compliance, as Honoré outlines,257 but also a 
sanction which goes some way to redressing the wrong committed. In the 
contaminated land context, the sanction would be in ensuring that the land is cleaned 
up or in paying for others to ensure that. This can be seen when once again we look 
at the analogy with a trust.258 The duty of a trustee is to personally account for what 
his beneficiary is due and he does this by either providing substitute performance or 
by paying money from his own account. As a result, not only must the steward be 
accountable for any failure to comply with his obligations but this accountability 
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must also lead to consequences designed to achieve the same end result as if he had 
complied with his duties in the first place. This type of accountability is therefore an 
essential element of a stewardship regime.  
(2) Does the obligation to take into account other interests relate only to the future or 
can it also be to preserve land for current generations and land users?  
 
In making decisions about the future of land then the steward is burdened with 
obligations, and will be accountable for any breach of these obligations, and so the 
final part of the picture of the hallmarks of stewardship is what obligations bind this 
decision-making power. He has an obligation to consider and take into account 
interests of future generations. We must ask whether this obligation to take account 
of future generations prevents the steward from taking account of the interests of 
current generations. It is submitted that it does not. Caldwell in his assessment of the 
meaning of stewardship includes an obligation to take into account the needs of 
present generations when making decisions about the land.259 Is this acceptable 
within a system of stewardship or is the focus only on the future - is there a duty 
owed also to present generations for responsible use? The reason why this question 
matters is because the two needs may conflict. How should this conflict be resolved? 
This is especially relevant in relation to land use since the needs of the present 
generation can clearly be detrimental to the future, without either use being 
irresponsible. 
The answer to this question lies not in a dichotomy between the present and the 
future, but rather in the types of current and future interests that should be taken into 
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account. Stewardship as a principle does not allow all future interests to be sacrificed 
for the benefit of the present, but it does not mean that the present interests cannot 
also be served. The solution of the types of consideration that should be taken into 
account feeds into our earlier discussion of the justifications for stewardship260 and 
into the question about instrumentality.261 Since the steward is decision-maker, he 
must be equipped with criteria to determine whose interests prevail where the 
interests of the present generation come into conflict with the potential interests of 
future generations. It is suggested that the source of this solution lies in the 
justifications for stewardship, in questions of intergenerational justice and ecological 
ethics. These both aim at balance: balance between the needs of the generations, and 
balance within the biosphere. The tools to assist the steward are to be found in these 
considerations, and as such economic advantage in the short term to the few should 
be discounted, but gradual rather than sudden improvement can be encouraged 
within stewardship since this achieves the balance that justice and ecological 
principles demand.  
The interests of future generations can therefore be balanced with the needs of the 
current generations, and given a lesser priority, where it is possible to conclude that 
the need of the current generation is greater and more pressing. The stewardship 
duty, as a result of its foundation in ethics, is above all else about finding a balance 
between what is currently needed and what will be needed in the future. It is not 
about excluding one interest. From this discussion then we can highlight another 
hallmark of stewardship - the steward must have to take into account the interests of 
future generations when making decisions about the property, and he must do so in 
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order to further the aim of the legal regime, i.e. to ensure that land is managed in a 
responsible and careful way. 
(c) Stewardship as an aspect of property 
 
Before we can compare the contaminated land regime with these hallmarks of 
stewardship however, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the role of 
steward and ownership of land. We have established that one element of the legal 
role of the steward is as the owner of land subjected to the various rights and duties 
associated with this ownership within a system of stewardship. Although it is clear 
that the usage of the term steward is sufficiently broad to cover those who are not 
owners, but are instead appointed by the owner to make decisions over land, the 
usage of the term relied on in this paper will be where the individual in question has 
rights of ownership in land, but where he must use these rights in accordance with 
the principle of stewardship. The reason for this is that this accords most closely with 
the justifications behind the ethical principle. It is also the way in which most people 
discuss stewardship today.  
Sheard highlights that “[s]uch stewardship rights are restricted property rights 
offering rights of use over land and its fruits but no right to damage it or to modify its 
nature in ways that put the basic interests of others, both current and future, at 
risk”.262 The other way of phrasing this is to say that stewardship obligations restrict 
property rights. This pattern of legal regulation of ownership can be seen in feudal 
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land holding, in the Roman concept of usufruct and in the Scottish clan system.263 
The true steward is the “owner” of the land in that he has those rights which entitle a 
person to make decisions about the land. As a result there is a very close link 
between stewardship and property rights and this relationship must be explored in 
more detail. 
Stewardship property is often contrasted with ‘private property’ and there is a long-
running dispute as to whether private property as a notion is compatible with duties 
of stewardship, especially where those duties are imposed under the public law. The 
essential point that advocates of this argument make is that once an owner of land is 
restricted in the content of his rights to the extent that stewardship obligations 
demand, he can no longer truly be considered as owner of the land. It is not simply 
that his ownership has been curtailed, but that it is meaningless to say that he is 
owner at all. An outline only of this debate will be given here for the purposes of 
highlighting certain aspects of stewardship. It is argued that there is no necessary 
conflict between ownership in private and a system that subjects private owners to 
certain duties based on the legal and ethical principle of stewardship. 
A starting point is in Waldron’s definition of private property: “in a system of private 
property, the rules governing access to and control of material resources are 
organised around the idea that resources are on the whole separate objects each 
assigned and therefore belonging to some particular individual”.264 A similar 
definition is used by Demsetz: “private ownership implies that the community 
recognizes the right of the owner to exclude others from exercising the owner’s 
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private rights”.265 Using this definition Lucy and Mitchell have argued that “the 
existence of a duty of stewardship cannot be compatible with a claim to have private 
property in land”.266  
This argument does not stand up to scrutiny however. Duties of stewardship do not 
alter the organisation of access to and control of land. The power to make decisions 
of access and control still lies with the owner of the land.267 The difference that the 
stewardship duties make is that he can be called to account for these decisions and 
that certain factors must be taken into account when making such decisions.268 The 
decisions can be reviewed as to whether they comply with his obligation to maintain 
the property for the benefit of the future. His decision-making power remains.  
For the same reason Gray’s argument that where there is legislation which imposes 
restriction in the interests of public protection, the property has thereby become 
quasi-public, and can no longer be considered as private property, cannot be 
sustained. He argues that in such cases “The state itself becomes a vital factor in the 
"property" equation: all "property" has a public law character. Private "property" is 
never truly private”.269 Certainly there is some scope within Waldron’s text for 
concluding that stewardship property is not private property when he states: “his [the 
owner’s] decision is to be upheld by society as final”270 in a system of private 
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property. Arguably the steward does not have the final decision since his decision-
making can be subject to review.271  
There is no difference between this and normal property rules however and it is 
suggested that Waldron here is not excluding the possibility of review of decision-
making, which, as we have highlighted, is an essential part of a system of 
stewardship. He is simply highlighting that the decision of the landowner is not to be 
taken as simply part of the equation of determining what is to happen to his land. 
There is a difference between the possibility of reviewing a decision, and treating 
that decision as only one stage in a multi-stage process. It is only the latter which is 
incompatible with Waldron’s definition. 
The power to review decisions in the courts at the suit of an organ of the state, be it 
the local authority or the Environment Agency, does not mean that the property is 
not held as private property and so this possibility in a regime based on stewardship 
does not mean that the property is not held in private. The question is not whether the 
decision is subject to review, but whether the owner of the land has a right to decide 
at all. In cases of stewardship the very essence of the principle is that he has a right 
to decide and a duty to decide in a certain fashion.  
It is clear then, as Karp highlights, that “[s]tewardship can be imposed on private 
property ownership whilst preserving the important characteristics of private 
ownership, such as shared expectations, stability, fairness and liberty”272 and, it has 
been argued here, decision-making power vesting with the owner. It is crucial is to 
recognize that the notion of stewardship relates to rights and duties - the content of 
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the ‘bundle of rights’273 that makes up ownership. It tells us nothing about whether or 
not private ownership should be permitted. Stewardship property would not fall 
under Waldron’s category of “collective property”274 since use and access to the 
property will not be determined by society as a whole for the benefit of society as a 
whole, but rather by an individual for a specified set of future interests. As a result, 
stewardship systems are compatible with the idea of private property; they just 
restrict private property rights and oblige the owner of the land to behave in a certain 
way. 
The point which those who contrast private and stewardship property are getting at 
can however be useful. They are attempting to highlight the differences between 
owning in a system of stewardship, and owning within a system where the right to 
use and abuse the land and to exploit it for the owner’s own benefit forms part of the 
‘bundle of rights’ making up, in Honoré’s terminology, the incidents of ownership.275 
English law has strongly resisted the idea that there can be a general equitable 
jurisdiction which prevents those with rights abusing them in order to maliciously 
harm others.276 It is therefore no surprise that there is no general principle that a 
landowner cannot use his rights in land in order to abuse his land. Frazier labels this 
theory which sees the starting point for ownership as ‘absolute ownership’ the 
“classical liberal property theory”.277  
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Although absolute rights of ownership have never existed in the sense that one 
person has all the incidents of ownership outlined by Honoré and unlimited liberty to 
do what he wants with an on his land, this idea does form the foundational 
philosophy of much worldwide regulation of ownership, especially in the USA278 
and UK.279 Nonetheless, Caldwell is correct to state that “[t]he right to hold, enjoy, 
develop, and protect land, as well as to profit from its use, was never absolute”.280 
Lucy and Mitchell agree with this assessment: “[The] undeniable truth about existing 
Western societies [is] that our rights of exclusion, control and alienation in relation to 
land are severely constrained”.281 This admission seems to detract from their 
argument that stewardship is incompatible with private property. Private property 
does not demand absolute rights. Caldwell accurately describes the attitude which is 
characteristic of systems of private property: “as owner of land he owed no 
obligation to neighbour or posterity, and very little to the state”.282 The attitude that 
an owner of land has no obligations to his neighbours of the future would be 
incompatible with stewardship, but there is no reason to adopt this attitude even if 
one does subscribe to a system of private property. Stewardship is therefore not 
incompatible with a system of private property. 
As a result of this attitude however, regulation which could be said to reflect 
stewardship will struggle to be accommodated within a system whose structures 
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evolved on the back of such a philosophy.283 A system of stewardship can then be 
contrasted with prevailing systems of private property in so far as the content of the 
rights, and more particularly the attitudes associated with ownership, will be 
different. This has led some to comment that “environmental rules of this kind are 
arguably a new species of property rule in that they impose positive obligations as an 
attribute of the exercise of ownership privileges”.284 This seems to overstate the 
position. Environmental rules do not necessarily impose a new species of ownership. 
Ownership is still in private. They simply impose a new attitude that must 
accompany this ownership. The change is one in philosophy, not in the structure of 
ownership. 
This change in philosophy does not mean that the notion of private property must be 
abandoned in favour of ownership on the basis of duties of stewardship. In fact, if 
individuals are to act as the steward it is necessary to retain a concept of private 
ownership. The relationship between stewardship and ownership of land is therefore 
not only a close one but also a critical one. In order to act as steward in the sense 
outlined here, the individual must have rights in the land in question in order to be 
able to make those decisions that are so central to his role. This begs the question 
then, who is the steward in this context? 
Since we have characterised the steward as being the owner of the land because he 
must be the primary decision-maker in relation to that land, it is important to clarify 
what conditions he must satisfy before he can be considered as such a decision-
maker. What rights must the steward of the land possess in order to be sufficiently 
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capable of controlling events on the land to usefully be labelled steward? The 
question is not whether a person is the absolute owner (if such a thing exists), but 
whether he has sufficient of the bundle of rights that make up ownership for him to 
be able to act as a steward for the land. We must ask firstly, then whether only the 
‘absolute owner’ (i.e. one who holds most if not all of the incidents of ownership 
outlined by Honoré) can be a steward of the property, and then secondly, whether 
more than one person or body can be the steward in relation to property at the same 
time.  
(1) Who is the steward? 
 
As far as the former issue is concerned, it is suggested that it need not be the 
‘absolute owner’ of the property in the sense of an unburdened freehold owner. It 
will be very rare that a freehold owner of a parcel of land finds his land entirely 
unencumbered - freehold covenants, easements or the rights of a tenant will all 
restrict his rights of ownership as do the rules of the tort of nuisance. This is not a 
barrier to the imposition of stewardship obligations. What this does mean however is 
that the ‘owner’ in this broader sense, i.e. someone with sufficient rights to act as a 
steward generally, may not be able to take a particular decision that he believes is 
necessary to protect the interests of a future generation. One example might be that 
he is not entitled to allow some trees to grow since his land is burdened by a 
neighbour’s right to light. In this case the owner would not have the right to grow 
trees, and there is no right to be burdened by his stewardship obligation. The owner 
cannot decide to grow trees, and so there is no decision-making process into which 
considerations of the interests of future generations can be fed.   
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This does not mean that no one is capable of being a steward however simply 
because their ownership rights are restricted in other ways. The person capable of 
being steward will simply be the person who is best placed to make decisions about 
the future of the property, i.e. the person who is capable of being steward. It is 
acknowledged that this is a somewhat circular definition, but it does at least make 
clear that there is no question of needing an absolute owner able to make every 
decision about the land.  
Often it will not even be the person that we might commonly call the owner of the 
land who is best placed to make the decisions over the land. In relation to long 
leases, as is discussed below, if the freeholder can make decisions he may fall under 
a stewardship obligation, but, depending on the terms of the lease, he may not have 
any such power. The long leaseholder however is unlikely to have freedom to do 
whatever he wishes with the land. The incidents of ownership are divided and the 
position where there are multiple owners is discussed below.285 The steward will 
however probably need to have certain types of rights before we can truly conclude 
that he is the steward. These rights would include, for example, the rights to decide 
the use to which the land is put; whether buildings can be erected on the site; whether 
the site can be used for excavation; if there is to be demolition of buildings; and the 
right to make decisions about the bringing in of wastes or other toxic materials onto 
the site that may cause harm to nature or lead to contamination on the site, amongst 
others.  
Furthermore, Sheard argues that the content of a property right bounded by the 
principles of stewardship will vary according to the type of property we are dealing 
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with since the manner and needs for management of it for the preservation of future 
generations will depend on what the actual thing is.286 As a result it is not possible to 
outline definitively in advance what rights are needed, hence the circular nature of 
the test employed. It is not argued that the test is necessarily helpful in practical 
terms, but it is suggested that it does clarify what is crucial about the person whom 
we are to label steward. It is not the person who would be most able to make the 
relevant decision as a result of his knowledge of ecological science, or the person 
with the most resources to put into managing land: it is the person who is best placed 
to manage the land given the rights that they have. It is for this reason that 
stewardship attaches to the owner of rights in land. 
 
Finally, we must ask what impact on this analysis is made by the fact of rights of 
alienation. The owner of land can sell his land. Is this right bound by the duty of 
stewardship, or does it fall without the scope of the stewardship concept? It is 
suggested here that since it falls under the decision-making powers in relation to the 
land, the landowner will be bound to consider the needs of future generations and his 
obligation to manage the land to that effect when deciding to alienate his land. He 
could therefore be in breach of his stewardship obligations by transferring his land to 
another whom he knows will not act responsibly in relation to their own management 
of the land. It may also be that the person to whom the land is transferred does not 
comply with their stewardship obligations without the original owner being in 
breach. All will depend on the facts, but the existence of a right of alienation does 
not prevent the owner of land being considered its steward. He is simply able to 
                                                
286 Murray Sheard, supra n262 at 396. 
Emma Lochery 
090000290 
 
 
92 
resign from this post. Stewardship then is intimately connected with ownership and 
the rights associated with that ownership. 
(2) Multiple owners 
  
What happens however where different persons are authorised to make these 
decisions? There is an essential distinction in cases like this between those who are 
in general entitled to make decisions by virtue of their own rights in the land in 
question (such as the grant of a lease), and those who have been authorised by 
another to make decisions but do not have rights in the land. The latter category is 
the idea of the land agent in the sense used in the 19th century.287 The land agent was 
authorised to make decisions about the estate and was its manager. This person is not 
the steward in the sense used in this thesis. The key to this lies in the fact that the 
authorisation for such a person to make decisions springs from somewhere and in 
most cases this will be from the freehold or long leasehold owner. The freeholder or 
leaseholder have chosen to delegate their decision-making, but have not limited their 
own property rights in the process. As a result they would remain steward. The land 
agent is simply an extension of the landowner himself. Where however the 
landowner grants out some of their own property rights, as with the grant of a lease, 
they may surrender enough of their own decision-making powers so as to no longer 
be the person most able to make those decisions necessary to be a steward. 
It is in theory possible however that two or more people may be the steward of the 
property. There are two situations where this might happen. Firstly, there may be 
joint tenants of a long lease, or holders of the freehold as a joint tenancy. These 
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people hold under the same title and as a result have identical rights over the 
property. Where there was more than one person with the same title, the stewardship 
would then operate in the same manner as a trust since there can of course be more 
than one trustee, but they hold rights in the property identical to all other trustees. It 
is only at this point that factual possession will become relevant since where there 
are multiple owners the person in possession may in fact be best placed to decide the 
future of the property. This does not affect the character of the steward, simply their 
knowledge and practical ability. This position in terms of the stewardship obligation 
is relatively straightforward. The parties are owners of a single, unified estate, and 
are therefore jointly obliged to manage their land in such a way as to advance the 
interests of future generations. 
Secondly, there may also be two or more owners of the land, for example under the 
relationship of landlord and tenant, or perhaps also where there is one person with a 
life interests or an equitable title under a bare trust, and another legal owner. In these 
cases the individuals have different rights and decision-making powers. It is argued 
here that although in some of these cases there will be more than one steward (in the 
case of certain landlord and tenant relationships) this will not always be the case. 
Crucially, when the relationship between the potential ‘owners’ is regulated under 
the trust, it will be the trustee, not the beneficiary under the trust who will be the 
steward, except in those cases where the trust mechanism is used to grant life 
interests,288 since the balance of obligations between legal owner and beneficiary are 
quite different to the ‘normal’ trust situation. These situations will be examined in 
turn.  
                                                
288 Law of Property Act 1925, section 1. 
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The position of landlord and tenant is one where it is possible that there will be more 
than one steward in relation to the land, and the stewards will have different rights 
over the land, and thus in consequence, they will have different decision-making 
powers. There are some situations, it is submitted, where the rights of the tenant 
under the particular lease arrangement will be such that it is not possible to conclude 
that they have any stewardship obligations. Thus in short residential leases, although 
the tenant will have an estate in the land, this estate will not have been granted with 
the power to make any decisions over the state of the land. In this case, although it 
would be possible to conclude that there is a stewardship obligation in one sense, 
since the tenant is an owner of an estate in land, the obligations would not ‘bite’ as 
there would be no rights to decision-making that would be limited by the stewardship 
obligation. In longer leases, and in leases where more extensive decision-making 
powers are granted, the stewardship obligation will bind the tenant to the extent of 
his estate. As a result, in a lease of 10 years in relation to a commercial building, for 
example, the company tenant would be obliged to manage their use of the building in 
such a way as to ensure that they were acting for the benefit of future generations. 
The extent of the obligation would relate to the extent of the rights.  
There is a problem with this analysis which is that leasehold estates are, by their very 
nature, limited as to time, and the right over the land is limited accordingly. The 
freehold interest is, by contrast, in theory indefinite. Does it matter that the rights of 
the leaseholder are limited in time and that the leasehold estate can disappear? The 
reason why this might matter is if the stewardship obligation depends on the chain of 
ownership over land, as it appears to have done in the traditional system of Scottish 
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land holding for example.289 It is submitted here however that since stewardship can 
be justified by wide considerations of justice not related to the relationship between 
successive land owners per se as explained above, it does not depend on the idea of 
the chain of ownership. The steward is not just managing his land for the benefit of 
future owners but for the benefit of future generations in general. This means that it 
does not matter that there may not be a chain of leasehold ownership in the land.  
Similarly, it could be argued that the very philosophy of the lease, as ownership 
limited in time, is contrary to the idea that the estate should be managed for the 
benefit of the future. It might be that whilst the freeholder has responsibilities to the 
future, one of the great advantages of being a leaseholder is to remove the 
responsibility to maintain the property. Instead, the property can be used as desired, 
within the terms of the lease, with the freeholder left with any remaining 
responsibilities to ensure that the land is managed responsibly etc. In short, it could 
be argued that the lease arrangement is the entire extent of the obligations that will 
fall on the leaseholder.  
This cannot be true. A leaseholder, as occupier of the land, can fall under numerous 
duties that are not outlined in the lease document, e.g. in relation to nuisance and the 
rules under the Occupiers’ Liability Acts. The lease does not outline the total extent 
of the duties that fall on a leaseholder. Thus, if the leaseholder has rights which allow 
him to make decisions over the future of a particular area of land, then he will fall 
under stewardship obligations when making such decisions. He may not have such 
rights, but if he does have such rights, the fact that he is a leaseholder as opposed to a 
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freehold owner should make no difference to the conclusion that he falls under an 
obligation to manage the land for the benefit of future generations.  
This analysis can be demonstrated by an example. The provisions of a lease stipulate 
that whilst the lessee is able to develop the property, he must obtain the consent of 
the freeholder. How would the stewardship obligations operate in this situation? It is 
suggested that the correct way to analyse this is as the lessee having the primary 
decision-making right but this right is limited by his obligations to manage the land 
for the benefit of the future. So, he would only be able to propose a development 
where that development met with his stewardship obligations. His rights are limited 
both by the obligations contained in the lease and the obligations that are imposed on 
him by the principle of stewardship. The freeholder does not have the right to build 
on the land but he does also have an important decision-making right and he too 
must act in such a way as to comply with his stewardship obligations. If the parties 
disagreed about the best way to proceed, and the landlord for example refused his 
consent where the development would benefit future generations, it is suggested that 
under a system of stewardship the landlord could be held accountable for his failure 
to grant consent to such a development.  
In addition, where the terms of a lease were such that any compliance with them 
would inevitably lead to a breach of stewardship obligations, it is submitted that this 
does not alter the fact that the leaseholder is under such an obligation. He will simply 
be in breach of it if he decides something that he has power to decide in a way that 
contradicts his stewardship duties. If however the lease leaves him with no power of 
decision, then the breach of the stewardship obligations will rest with the landlord. In 
divesting himself of his rights of decision-making in such a way as to make a breach 
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of the obligations of stewardship inevitable, he has breached his own obligation to 
use his decision-making powers in a way as to comply with stewardship. As a result, 
although in practice the situation where there are multiple owners under a lease may 
be complex, in theory, the rights in the land are limited by stewardship obligations, 
whatever the nature of the estate held.  
A good example of this sort of potential conflict- where the obligations of the 
steward conflict- is the position of the rules of good husbandry in agricultural 
leases.290 Here, the requirement to maximise profit from the leased land will, in 
England at least, take precedence over the fact that the tenant has entered into a 
public stewardship scheme.291 The tenant falls under conflicting obligations. How are 
such obligations to be reconciled and on whom does the responsibility fall for failure 
to comply with the stewardship obligation? It is suggested that in such 
circumstances, it is simply a matter of choice for the legal system to prioritise the 
obligations292 and it is possible to conclude that the stewardship obligation which 
binds the rights that the various parties have, takes precedence over their private 
arrangements inter se and forms part of the general law, as with nuisance or the 
Ocucpier’s Liability Acts. Thus the tenant could still fall under a stewardship 
obligation. 
What is the position where, rather than more than one estate over the land, there is a 
legal and an equitable owner of the estate? There are again two situations to discuss 
here. The first is where there is a trustee of the freehold for the benefit of one or 
                                                
290 Christopher Rodgers, “Rural Development Policy and Environmental Protection: Reorienting 
English Law for a Multifunctional Agriculture” (2009) 14 Drake Journal of Agricultural Law 259 at 
284-287. 
291 See R (Davies) v Agricultural Land Tribunal & Philipp [2007] EWHC 1395 (Admin). 
292 See the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003. 
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more beneficiaries. The second is where there is a trustee of the freehold but the 
beneficiary has a life interest under a trust. In the former situation the position is 
fairly straightforward since the trustee as legal owner will be the one able to make 
decisions over the property. Under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees 
Act 1996 (TLATA) the trustee will be required to consult with his beneficiaries 
when making decisions so far as is reasonably possible,293 but is not required to 
obtain the consent of his beneficiary etc. As a result, the trustee will be able to make 
the relevant decisions himself in relation to the land and so will be under stewardship 
obligations in relation to the exercise of his rights. Although, under section 12 
TLATA 1996, the beneficiary may have a right to occupy the land, this does not give 
him the right to make decisions over the state of the land except where the decision-
making power is delegated from the trustee in which case the stewardship obligation 
would remain with the trustee. Bare trusts and trusts for more than one beneficiary 
do not therefore pose a problem.  
The operation of trusts which give rise to a life interest in the land may be more 
complex. In such cases the decision-making powers over the land vest in the 
beneficiary. The tenant for life cannot act in any way which fundamentally alters the 
nature of the land, whether for better or for worse294 and although most ‘improving’ 
actions will be permitted by the courts, any act which completely changes the land 
will not be permitted. This may severely restrict the rights of the life tenant and may 
mean that they are not able to make decisions to manage the land for the benefit of 
the future, but neither is the trustee able to make such decisions. This produces some 
difficulty for the analysis of who will be steward in this case. It can however be 
                                                
293 TLATA 1996, Section 11. 
294 Lord Darcy v Askwith (1618) Rob. 234. 
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determined that the life tenant will be the steward since in practice they have rights 
to take decisions over the property. The trustee is still responsible however for the 
exercise of the legal rights associated with his title, and as such he will be liable also 
where the exercise of these rights breaches his stewardship obligations. Their rights 
to do so may be severely curtailed, but the rights of a freeholder owner with no trusts 
interest etc may also be so curtailed as a result of the planning, tort other systems. 
Not having the full panoply of decision-making rights does not mean that a 
landowner is unable to fall under a stewardship obligation in relation to the rights 
that they do hold.  
This discussion demonstrates therefore that it is possible to have multiple stewards in 
relation to one area of land where there are multiple right holders over that land. 
These rights will be limited by stewardship obligations. Thus each owner will be a 
steward to the extent of his rights. This discussion then has allowed us to ascertain 
who we will call steward, and what sort of obligations he will fall under. It has also 
highlighted a number of other characteristics of a regime that imposes such an 
obligation. It is to these characteristics that we now turn when assessing the 
contaminated land regime.  
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V What are the hallmarks of stewardship? 
 
This extensive discussion of the ethical and legal principles of stewardship should 
now allow us to formulate a list of hallmarks which allow us to judge whether a 
regime, and here the contaminated land regime, is a system based upon the principles 
of stewardship and operating accordingly. Six hallmarks will be outlined briefly here 
along with the methodology that will be used here to test them. The purpose of this 
list is simply to provide a clear structure against which we can judge the regime. As a 
result it is perhaps oversimplified but it will at least provide a starting point for the 
ensuing discussion of the contaminated land provisions.  
(1) The aim of the regime must be to preserve the quality and state of land for the 
future.  
This simply looks at the aims of the regime. It is possible to derive the aim of a 
regime from the manner of its introduction and the statements of its proposers etc.295 
This approach to assessment of aim was taken above when discussing the motivation 
for the paper, but in analysing the regime itself the thesis will take a different 
approach. Instead of looking at the professed aim of the regime it will instead 
attempt to use the statutory provisions and guidance alone to determine the aim. We 
are looking for an objectively ascertainable aim from the provisions of the regime. 
This thesis will do this by looking at the criteria for intervention within the regime 
since this will demonstrate the harm that the regime is seeking to address.  
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(2) The regime must attempt to meet this aim by placing obligations on the owner of 
land for careful and responsible use and management.  
This requirement focuses on two separate issues: the first is that the regime must in 
fact place an obligation on the owner of land by burdening his ownership rights. In 
order to determine this a brief discussion of the meaning of obligation will be 
followed by a close examination of the operation of the regime in relation to the 
owners of land to determine whether we can consider them to fall under an 
obligation. The second issue is that this obligation must be to make careful and 
responsible use and management of the land. In order to ascertain this, once it has 
been determined whether there is an obligation on the owners of land, the content of 
this obligation will be discussed.  
(3) In considering what constitutes such careful and responsible use and management 
the landowner must, as a result of the regime, take account of the needs of future 
generations.  
Following from the discussion in relation to hallmark (2), this hallmark requires that 
not only the obligation outlined in (2) relates to careful use and management, but 
also that in assessing what constitutes careful management, the owner of the land 
consider the needs of future generations. This will be determined by assessing what 
processes the owner must go through in making their decision and what factors must 
be taken into account. It is not necessary that future interests are the only factors 
considered, but it is necessary that they at least play a part.  
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(4) This obligation to make careful and responsible use and management of the land 
taking into account the needs of future generations must burden the owner’s rights of 
ownership in the land.  
This hallmark calls for the obligation itself to attach to the landowner’s rights of 
ownership, not simply one incident of the rights of ownership e.g. the right to 
alienate the land. In order to ascertain whether this is the case in the contaminated 
land regime, the mechanism for imposition of the obligation on the owner of land 
will be examined.  
(5) Not only must the regime call on the owner to do all these things, he must do 
them in a certain way. His decision-making process must be altered by the regime 
such that stewardship itself is encouraged rather than merely the outcome of the 
preservation of land. 
This hallmark moves away from the content of the obligation itself and into the 
procedural aspects of a stewardship regime. The question focuses on whether the 
owner, in carrying out his obligation, is entitled to make the decision for himself in 
accordance with the philosophy of stewardship or whether the standard of 
remediation and the process of remediation is set by the regime itself thus robbing 
the steward of the appropriate attitude. This paper will examine this by looking in 
detail at the standard of remediation to be reached and the process by which a plan of 
action for cleaning up the land is formulated under the EPA 1990.  
(6) The owner must be answerable for failures to meet his obligations. 
Finally there must be some mechanism by which the owner of the land is made 
answerable for any failure to take account of the needs of future generations and to 
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make careful use of the land and manage it responsibly. This paper will look at this 
by examining the body to which the owner is responsible, usually the local authority, 
and in some cases the Environment Agency, since they make the assessment as to 
whether land is contaminated, and what format this responsibility takes.  
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VI: Does the Contaminated Land Regime Match these Hallmarks? 
 
(a) Does the regime aim to preserve the quality and state of land for the future? 
 
We have established that in order to represent a regime based on stewardship, the 
contaminated land provisions must aim to manage the state of land for the benefit of 
future generations, at least in part. This was one of the express aims of the drafters of 
the legislation.296 The legislation itself must now be analysed to determine whether 
this aim is mirrored in the provisions such that the first hallmark of stewardship is 
met. Three key issues will be examined. Firstly, the criteria for intervention will be 
examined. Secondly, the role of the principle of risk assessment will be looked at in 
more detail. Finally, the tension in the regime between current usage and protecting 
future generations will be considered. 
Before looking at these issues in more detail, the general criteria for intervention 
must be outlined. The starting point is to be found in section 78A(2)(a) EPA 1990 - “ 
‘Contaminated land’ is any land which appears to the local authority in whose area it 
is situated to be in such a condition, by reason of substances in, on or under the land, 
that - (a) significant harm is being caused or there is a significant possibility of such 
harm being caused”. It is only if these conditions are present that the contaminated 
land provisions come into play. As a starting point it is worth noting that this 
definition in itself is not confined to preventing present harm. The notion of “risk of 
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harm” (as opposed to current harm) demonstrates that the regime is not simply 
concerned with past or continuing harm. It has at least half an eye on the future.  
This conclusion is given more weight by the content of Annex 3 of the binding 
statutory guidance in DEFRA Circular 01/2006. The guidance makes it clear that the 
local authority can only conclude that the land is contaminated where the conditions 
in the relevant Table are met. Table A is concerned with whether there is currently 
significant harm being caused by reason of a substance in or under the land which 
although focussed on the present through the need for current harm, gives indications 
as to the longer term aims of the provisions as well. It contains criteria in relation to 
four different receptors. The treatment of these gives support to the notion that the 
regime aims at protecting interests of future generations.  
The first receptor to be dealt with in the Table is “human beings”. The definition 
specifies that where humans are concerned “significant harm” will include “death, 
disease, serious injury, genetic mutation, birth defects or the impairment of 
reproductive functions”.297 The focus on birth defects and reproduction is especially 
significant in showing that the regime aims to protect and indeed promote the 
existence and well-being of future generations. In short, the regime sees as 
significant, and therefore worth intervening to prevent, any harm which threatens the 
basic survival of human beings, both for now and for the future. It aims to ensure the 
continuing existence of the human species, and thus protects future generations also. 
This ties in with the definition of stewardship provided by Attfield.298 The principles 
of intergenerational justice require us to at least ensure that the human species can 
                                                
297 United Kingdom, DEFRA, “The Environmental Protection Act: Part IIA- Contaminated Land”, 
Circular 01/2006 (London: 2006), Annex 3, Table A(1). 
298 See page 41-42. 
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flourish. The regime does address these basic human needs and as such can be seen 
to aim to advance the interests of future generations to a limited, but important 
extent. 
Problems caused to nature too are addressed in Annex 3. The criteria for intervention 
are met where there is a risk of significant harm to a part of the ecosystem only 
where there is a pre-existing conservation measure in place. Such measures include 
designation as an Site of Special Scientific Interest,299 National Nature Reserve,300 
and as an Special Protection Area or Special Areas of Conservation.301 These areas 
have been designated as vulnerable or of special scientific interests and thus both for 
the present and for the future they are the areas most worthy of protection.  In 
restricting the natural interests that can be taken into account, the regime strikes a 
balance between the needs of the present and those of the future.  
It is crucial to note however that the definition of significant harm highlights that the 
regime does aim to protect natural interests for the benefit of the future. It is 
specified that harm will be significant where it results in “an irreversible adverse 
change, or in some other substantial adverse change, in the functioning of the 
ecological system… or harm which affects any species of special interest within that 
location and which endangers the long-term maintenance of the population of that 
species”.302 This criterion highlights that the status quo is worthy of protection - the 
harm to be avoided is adverse ‘change’. This is significant in that it implies that 
maintenance rather than improvement in relation to natural interests may be enough 
                                                
299 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, Section 28. 
300 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, Section 35. 
301 Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010, S.I. 2010/490. 
302 DEFRA, supra n297, Annex 3, Table A(2). 
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except where long-term population numbers are affected. Thus again although the 
primary focus of the regime is the present, there is recognition that the future 
generations should be taken into account with the reliance on long-term population 
numbers of other species since this all goes to maintaining the planet for the benefit 
of these future generations.   
This picture, that the definition of harm within the regime looks at points towards the 
future, is confirmed by the third aspect of the Table which is concerned with 
property. In this section the aspects of property protected are those basic foodstuffs 
and natural products that are essential for the continuance of life, both now and in the 
future. In addition, in the fourth part of the Table Ancient Monuments and historic 
buildings are given special protection. The Table states that harm is significant where 
“the damage significantly impairs the historic, architectural, traditional, artistic or 
archaeological interest by reason of which the monument was scheduled”.303 The 
definition of harm therefore focuses on those very factors that stewardship argues 
should be protected in order that future generations are given the ability to promote 
the distinctive human characteristics. This implies strongly that the regime does 
indeed aim at protection of future generations within its criteria for intervention 
along with the undeniable protection given to the present.  
Table A is not the only aspect of the definition of contaminated land that supports 
this conclusion. The approach that the regime takes to risk assessment and 
foreseeability is also significant. Para A:9 of Annex 3 of the Guidance introduces the 
concept of risk assessment for determining whether there is a possibility of 
significant harm. This concept encourages the idea that regime looks forward since it 
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takes a precautionary approach to whether harm might occur on the basis of 
scientific information, rather than an approach which looks at the potential 
seriousness of the harm weighed against the cost of preventing it. It therefore 
attempts to take an objective assessment as to whether prevention of the harm is 
necessary rather than in the interests of the present generation.  
Table B, which deals with the definition of “significant possibility of significant 
harm”, also asks only for scientific information on the likelihood of harm. It does not 
ask what the cost of preventing the potential future harm should be in order to meet 
the criteria for intervention. As a result it simply attempts to assess whether future 
generations will be harmed if no intervention is made and attempts to protect them 
from such harm. 
The regime undoubtedly at points looks to the future, even though the prevailing 
approach of the regime relates to current harm since the focus, as highlighted in Para 
A:25, is on the current use to which the land is being put. The paragraph instructs the 
enforcing authority to disregard anything which is not likely to be on the land under 
its current use. This does not mean however that the aim of the regime is not to 
protect future generations. Instead, it is argued here, this should be interpreted as the 
regime attempting to ensure that the status quo at least is protected for the benefit of 
future generations. A distinction is drawn between those who are likely to be 
harmed, a question which is ascertained by looking at current use, and those for 
whom we are attempting to prevent harm, which includes future users of the land. As 
a result, the argument that the regime is only looking to protect current generations 
because of its focus on current use does not stand up when discussing the aim of the 
regime. 
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(b) Does the regime place an obligation on the owner of the land for responsible 
management and use?  
 
Before looking at this second hallmark, it is necessary to look briefly at the question 
of what constitutes an obligation. There are essentially three ways of looking at 
obligations - the first is as a non-optional course of conduct;304 the second is as an 
exclusionary reason for action;305 and the third is as obligations being the corollary 
of rights.306 It is argued here that whichever of these definitions is adopted it is 
possible to conclude that the contaminated land provisions do indeed impose an 
obligation on the owner of land, but it is necessary to look at the meaning of these 
definitions in more detail in order to be able to demonstrate this.  
Firstly, according to Green, “[obligations] are legal requirements with which law's 
subjects are bound to conform. An obligatory act or omission is something the law 
renders non-optional”.307 The key to Green’s analysis of obligation is that he does 
not specify anything beyond the fact that the conduct must be non-optional. Crucially 
he does not link obligation and rights.  
Raz too demonstrates that for there to be an obligation there is no need for there to be 
a correlative right.308 Certainly he agrees that if there is a right there must be an 
obligation - but the opposite is not necessarily true. Kelsen would agree with this 
                                                
304 Leslie Green, “Legal Obligation and Authority” first published December 2003, viewed 11th 
February 2011,  <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation/>. 
305 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (London: Hutchison & Co Ltd, 1975). 
306 Wesley N Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1913) 23 
Yale Law Journal 16. 
307 Leslie Green, supra n304. 
308 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 170. 
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assessment.309 As a result of the argument, Raz is able to separate duty and right and 
concludes that an obligation is an exclusionary reason for action.310 The reason that 
he concludes that an obligation does not lead to non-optional conduct is that there 
can be more than one obligation on a person pushing in different directions. Instead, 
the existence of an obligation is not only a positive reason why someone should 
behave in a certain way, but also prevents them from taking account of some other 
reasons in assessing what course of conduct to take.  
This will become clearer with an example. There is an obligation to take reasonable 
care to avoid harming others. There is also a legal obligation to comply with our 
contractual obligations. If it would not be possible to comply with a contractual 
obligation without harming others arguably there are conflicting legal obligations 
resting on the actor. The solution lies in a third consideration i.e. that it is a defence 
to an alleged breach of contract if performance of it would be illegal. This third 
consideration solves the conflict. It is a consideration that the obligations do not 
exclude. The actor would not however be entitled to resolve the conflict by 
considering that it would be cheaper for him to pay damages to the injured party than 
to pay his contractual partner for breach of contract. Thus obligations act on our 
reasons for action - in law and in morality - but they do not render certain courses of 
action non-optional. They render certain reasons non-applicable. 
Hohfeldian analysis, by contrast, sees obligation or duty as the necessary opposite of 
a right. In order for there to exist an obligation there must be someone in whom this 
opposite right vests. Rights are reflections of the right-holder’s interests such that the 
                                                
309 Hans Kelsen (trans Michael Hartney), General Theory of Norms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 
at chapter 33, page 137. 
310 Joseph Raz, supra n305 at 35. 
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imposition of a duty is justified. Raz argues that assertions of rights are typically 
intermediate conclusions in arguments from ultimate values to duties.311 On this 
model then there would be an obligation resting on the owner of land where the 
interests of a rights-holder were reflected in a correlative duty.  
It is suggested that the contaminated land provisions can fit into whichever of these 
models is adopted but that it is necessary to outline these options in order to 
demonstrate why it is legitimate to conclude that there is an obligation here. Firstly 
we must ask whether the contaminated land provisions impose a non-optional course 
of conduct onto the owner of land so as to meet Green’s definition of obligation. It is 
suggested that whether or not the owner of the land becomes liable for the 
remediation works as a Class B person, the regime imposes a non-optional course of 
action upon them. This will be demonstrated firstly, in relation to the position of 
owners of land where there is a Class A person in existence, and then when the 
owner is a Class B person.  
Class A persons will be liable to remediate the land312 or to pay for the enforcing 
authority to clean it up.313 The owner of the land is however obliged to permit this to 
take place. It is non-optional for them to state that they do not wish their land to be 
remediated. Under section 78G(2) EPA 1990: “any person whose consent is required 
before any thing required by a remediation notice may be done shall grant, or join in 
granting, such rights in relation to any of the relevant land or waters as will enable 
the appropriate person to comply with any requirements impose by the remediation 
notice”. In all cases where a Class A person is liable to remediate the land where that 
                                                
311 Joseph Raz, “On the Nature of Rights” (1984) 43 Mind 194 at 195. 
312 EPA 1990 Section 78F(1)-(3). 
313 EPA 1990 Sections 78N and 78P. 
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Class A person is not the owner and occupier of the land, there will be an owner or 
occupier of the land who is required to grant such rights. Although under section 
78G(5) EPA 1990 such persons will be entitled to compensation, and under section 
78G(3) EPA 1990 will be entitled to be consulted before the remediation notice is 
served, the grant of the rights of entry, consents etc is non-optional. 
At this point it is worth emphasising the approach that the regime takes to the grant 
of such rights of entry since this is important in determining that an obligation does 
fall on the owner of land. It is submitted that there is a difference in this context 
between a deemed grant of rights and an obligation to grant these rights. Section 
78G(5) makes it clear that here we are dealing with an obligation to grant rights: “a 
person who grants or joins in granting”. The landowner must actually grant the 
rights. It is not that the need for these rights is dispensed with under the regime. As a 
result the grant of the rights is a course of conduct within Green’s definition. 
If no Class A person can be found however and a Class B person becomes the 
appropriate person then another obligation will fall on them. This is the obligation to 
remediate the land to the standard required. This obligation can lead onto the further 
obligations to carry out the steps required in the remediation notice but there is a pre-
existing obligation that arises simply by virtue of the identification of the land as 
being contaminated. The owner does not need to wait for the remediation notice to 
be put together before his initial obligation becomes apparent. This is because the 
enforcing authority is instructed not to serve a remediation notice314 if “[it] is 
                                                
314 EPA 1990, Section 78H(5)(b). 
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satisfied that appropriate remediation is being, or will be, carried out without the 
service of a remediation notice.”315   
The Class B person has an option - they can remediate the land to the appropriate 
standard voluntarily, or they can remediate the land according to the method outlined 
in the remediation statement. The obligation is to remediate the land to the required 
standard. At this point the method by which this takes place is not specified. There is 
therefore a legally non-optional course of conduct in the sense that the Class B 
person must remediate the land. If the Class B person does not undertake to 
remediate the land voluntarily there will be an obligation to comply with the 
remediation notice.316 It is not an obligation to clean up the land to an appropriate 
standard per se. If however the steps required in the remediation notice would not 
clean up the land to this standard it would be possible for the land to be again 
identified as contaminated such that the original obligation, i.e. to remediate the land, 
came into play. 
The contaminated land provisions do indeed impose a non-optional course of 
conduct. Green’s definition of obligation is met. Do the provisions also impose an 
obligation as defined by Raz? Does the requirement that the Class B person 
remediate the land to a certain standard (whether or not this is in accordance with a 
remediation notice) act as an exclusionary reason for action? In order to determine 
this we must look at whether the owner can conclude that he will not remediate the 
land for reasons of cost or inconvenience. The answer is that he cannot conclude that 
he will take no steps on the basis of cost or impracticality. The requirement of para 
                                                
315 DEFRA, supra n297, Annex 3, Para C.11. 
316 EPA 1990, Section 78G(1). 
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C.11 of Circular 01/2006 is that the voluntary remediation be of the same or better 
standard than that which could be required by a remediation notice. Remediation 
notices may only require that by way of remediation which is reasonable. As a result, 
the obligation to remediate does not include an obligation to go beyond that which is 
reasonable.317  
The test for reasonableness in this context is to be found in Part 5 of Annex 3 of the 
statutory guidance.318 The enforcing authority is entitled to take into account of the 
cost and practicality of the steps of remediation when assessing what to require by 
way of remediation notice. As a result, in order to achieve a standard better or equal 
to that required by the remediation notice, the individual, when considering whether 
to voluntarily remediate, is entitled to take account of cost and practicality. Costs and 
practicality cannot however ‘trump’ the requirement of remediation. The costs and 
practicality considerations go into what is to be done by way of remediation and 
demand that a cost-benefit analysis be carried out. To this extent then although the 
‘desires’ of the appropriate person in terms of costs in particular can be taken into 
account, when taking as the starting point the requirement that the land in fact be 
remediated, it is suggested that the fact the costs considerations etc can be taken into 
account does not mean that the requirement to remediation does not operate as an 
exclusionary reason. Costs can only be taken into account in certain ways and under 
restricted terms. Thus some reasons for action are ruled out and Raz’s definition of 
an obligation is met.  
                                                
317 EPA 1990, Section 78E(4). 
318 DEFRA, supra n297, Annex 3, Para C.29-C.43. 
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Finally then, and perhaps most problematically, we must deal with a Hohfeldian 
analysis of obligations which requires that there be correlative in the form of a right. 
In our discussion of the meaning of stewardship, it has already been explained that it 
is possible for future generations to be holders of rights even if they are not capable 
of enforcing them.319 Furthermore, as Brown Weiss highlights “there is no 
theoretical basis for limiting such rights to immediately successive generations. If we 
were to do so, we would often provide little or no protection to more distant future 
generations”.320 It is suggested that if the requirement for remediation is to be tied to 
a right, this right must be in part also a right held by the current users of the land not 
to be harmed by the contaminating substances on the land, and in part a right in 
future generations to receive the land in a state consistent with the promotion of their 
basic needs and to allow the flourishing of their distinctively human characteristics. 
Is this then capable of founding the corresponding duty on the Class B person to 
remediate their land? Following Raz’s approach, we must ask whether the interests 
behind the right that vests in future generations are sufficient to ground duties in the 
present generation.321 We have already outlined above the sorts of interests that are 
in play here - survival, enjoyment, learning, creativity etc. These interests are, it is 
submitted, enough to conclude that duties should be imposed on persons today for 
the benefit of other persons today. Survival certainly justifies many of our current 
obligations. There is no reason why the same considerations cannot justify the 
imposition of an obligation on the basis of rights that vest in future generations. As a 
                                                
319 See pages 46-51. 
320 Edith Brown-Weiss, “Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment” 
(1990) 84 American Journal of International Law 198 at 202. 
321 Joseph Raz, supra n305. 
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result, even the Hohfeldian definition of obligation is met if it is understood that 
future generations are capable of holding rights.  
The contaminated land provisions therefore do seem to place the obligation to 
remediate outlined above onto the shoulders of the owner where there is no Class A 
person, and the obligation to grant rights to the Class A person to allow them to 
remediate the land where there is a Class A person. The regime does so because of 
the rights over the land, to decide its future, to grant access etc, that this person, the 
owner, holds. The obligation is dependent on their holdings rights. Thus far the 
regime coincides with the hallmark of stewardship. We must determine however 
whether the obligation here is an obligation for “responsible management and use”.  
The obligation must be to manage the land in such a way that the resources on and 
within it, as well as the land itself, are used in a responsible and sustainable way. 
This is not asking whether the obligation protects these resources for future 
generations, but simply whether the obligation protects these resources at all. 
Evidence for the fact that that regime does indeed protect these resources can be 
found in the standard of remediation that must be reached, and the guidance on this 
standard in particular.  
The standard to which land must be remediated is that it is “suitable for use”. If the 
regime were to be purely based on stewardship then the standard would have to be an 
absolute one to ensure that future generations interests were perfectly served, but the 
lesser, more practical standard used, does not prevent the conclusion that one of the 
aims of the regime is to impose stewardship obligations. Suitable for use is defined 
in the guidance as meaning that, under its current use, the land no longer meets the 
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definition of contaminated land. That is, the contaminating substance in or under the 
land, after the remediation has been carried out, must no longer be causing 
significant harm or posing a significant risk of significant harm. This means that the 
harms discussed in relation to the aim of the regime, as expressed in its criteria for 
intervention, must be remedied. We discussed above the nature of these harms in 
relation to the aim of responsible management of land. The criteria for when land is 
remediated, i.e. when the ‘owner’s’ obligation is met, is intimately connected then to 
the aim expressed through the definition of these harms. The final aspect of this 
hallmark of stewardship is therefore met.  
(c) Does the regime ensure that, when considering what constitutes careful and 
responsible use and management of the land, the owner take account of the needs of 
future generations? 
 
The conclusion that the contaminated land provisions do place an obligation on the 
owner of land to ensure that the land resource under his control is managed 
effectively and responsible is only the first step in establishing that a stewardship 
obligation is thereby imposed. It must also be concluded that the obligation imposed 
contains within it a requirement that the owner of the land take account of the needs 
and interests of future generations when deciding what constitutes such responsible 
use. In relation to the contaminated land provisions, in order to determine whether 
that is the case here, we will look at the role of the future within this regime and how 
this interacts with the standard of remediation and process of remediating.  
Firstly then in relation to the standard of remediation that must be reached and 
whether this takes account of the needs of future generations, there are two problems. 
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The regime talks of the standard of remediation in terms of the current use of the 
land. Additionally when it does talk of taking into account what may happen in the 
future, this consideration is always bound by the criteria of foreseeability. It is 
argued here however that this does not mean that the needs of future generations are 
not taken into account at all, but simply that they are curtailed. The reason for this 
curtailment will be looked at in more detail in the section of this paper discussing the 
conclusions reached about the fit between the contaminated land provisions and 
stewardship,322 but it is enough to note here that curtailing the distance we must look 
into the future does not necessarily mean that future interests are not taken into 
account.  
In order to demonstrate this, the first step is to look at the notion of “suitable for 
use”. This means, as the guidance makes clear, suitable for current use: “the aim of 
any remediation should be to ensure that the circumstances of the land are such that, 
in its current use… it is no longer contaminated”.323 Again this is not an absolute 
standard, but a practical one based on the philosophy that present users of the land 
should be protected as well as future generations, but that a balance must be struck 
between these interests. Current use is defined as the use which is permitted without 
need for a new planning permission. This is quite a narrow range and so the term 
‘current use’ really does mean current use here - a change from general industrial to 
business use would be enough to take the new usage outside the scope of the 
contaminated land provisions.324 Similarly, when defining what constitutes a 
significant possibility of a significant harm the guidance stipulates that the harm can 
                                                
322 See pages 134-142. 
323 DEFRA, supra n297, Annex 3, Para C.17. 
324 Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987- this change the use from B2 to B1. 
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only be to current users of the land or users foreseeable under the current use. As a 
result, land must be remediated to the standard where current users or users 
foreseeable under the current use will not be harmed. This means that a change of 
use may mean that the land becomes “contaminated again”.  
This criterion then does not take account of future interests in the land except where 
those future interests are taken to be identical to the current interests in the land 
(since the land will be being put to the same use). Where it does explicitly refer to 
the future however (as with potential foreseeable users under the current use) it does 
so only as far as is foreseeable. This can be seen in Table B in relation to “building 
effects”. The guidance states that there is a significant possibility of significant harm 
(and so land will not have been remediated to the required standard) where: “harm… 
is more likely than not to result from the pollutant linkage in question during the 
expected economic life of the building (or, in the case of a scheduled Ancient 
Monument, the foreseeable future)”.325 There is an explicit view to the future here, 
but this is quite a narrow requirement, and it is relatively unusual within the regime 
itself. There is no requirement to take account of the needs of future humans per se, 
except in so far as their interests will be considered if the use of the land remains the 
same. It is therefore difficult to conclude that the standard of remediation and thus 
the content of the obligation that rests on the landowner is an obligation to take 
account of the needs of future generations beyond the narrow band of ‘future’ 
persons within the framework of current use and foreseeability. 
There is however one area within the regime where the needs of future generations 
are explicitly taken into account, and this is through the requirement of continuing 
                                                
325 Ibid, Annex 3, Table B. 
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monitoring that can form part of the remediation package. This monitoring 
requirement will mean that the state of the land continues to be kept under 
observation, potentially beyond the current use. The only reason why there would be 
a requirement for monitoring is to benefit future generations since by definition the 
land would be remediated to the point where it is not causing harm to current users. 
This monitoring requirement also means that future generations will come under an 
obligation to the generations beyond them.  
The guidance makes clear that in most circumstances: “The phasing of remediation is 
likely to follow a progression from assessment actions, through remedial treatment 
actions and onto monitoring actions”.326 Such monitoring requirements should be 
imposed where, “the authority will need to consider whether any further remedial 
treatment action will be required as a consequence of any change that may occur”.327 
This monitoring can only be used in relation to the existing identified pollutant. It 
cannot be used to discover whether there is a new contaminant causing harm. It is 
designed to discover whether the land has indeed been cleaned up, but it does so with 
a view to any change which may occur. It is submitted that it may therefore be a back 
route to taking account of a change of use. If there is a monitoring requirement in 
place and the use of the land changes, the monitoring requirement helps to protect 
the interests of those users of the land under its new use. These individuals are 
protected throughout the remediation process by system of monitoring.  
It seems then that there may be a “back door” method of taking account of the needs 
of future generations through the monitoring requirement in a way which is not 
                                                
326 Ibid, Annex 3, Para C.13. 
327 Ibid, Annex 3, Para C.68(b). 
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restricted by foreseeability and current use. The main thrust of the regime however is 
not to take account of future generations generally, but a restricted subset of future 
generations. This hallmark is therefore met only to a limited extent.  
(d) Do the provisions burden the rights of the owner with the obligations of 
stewardship? 
 
Before explaining this lack of fit however it is necessary to look at the fourth 
hallmark. It seems then that there is no doubt that the contaminated land provisions 
do impose obligations on Class B persons whether or not there is a Class A person. 
We must ask now however whether this obligation burdens their ownership rights. In 
order to determine this, the place of the owner where there is a Class A person will 
first be examined. From here the definition of owner for the purposes of determining 
who is a Class B person will be looked at, along with the exclusion tests which 
operate when there is more than one Class B person. It will be seen that the regime 
attempts as far as possible to impose the obligation outlined here onto that person 
who is best placed to make decisions about the land such that they are subject to 
stewardship duties. 
Firstly then, where there is a Class A person, we have outlined that the obligation 
lying on the owner or occupier of the land will be to grant rights of entry and other 
rights that are necessary for the Class A person to carry out the steps required of 
them by way of remediation.328 How does this relate to our definition of the steward? 
Certainly the obligation is not phrased in terms of decision-maker, but it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the person who has the power to grant rights of entry will 
                                                
328 See page 23. 
Emma Lochery 
090000290 
 
 
122 
be the person entitled to control access to the land. This is one of the crucial 
decision-making powers outlined above. Similarly, the person granting the rights will 
normally be the person who in ordinary circumstances would control what works are 
carried out on the land. In reality then this person will probably be the very same 
person described as the steward for the very reason that the rights required to grant 
the rights of entry etc will be those same rights that would be required to make 
stewardship decisions. The obligation arises because of the rights that they hold. 
These rights are what make them owner and therefore mean that they fall under 
stewardship obligations. Thus the rights are granted because of their position as 
owner.  
The same can be said when we consider the position of Class B persons. Class B 
persons are defined as the owner or occupier of the land for the time being. This 
alone indicates that we are probably dealing with the type of person capable of 
falling under stewardship obligations. Owner is defined in section 78A(9) EPA 1990 
as the person entitled to receive the rack rent. This means that in most cases the 
owner will be the freehold owner but in certain circumstances a leasehold owner 
entitled to receive rack rent will also be the owner. Regardless of the title that they 
hold however a person entitled to receive such rent will normally have sufficient 
rights to make decisions about the land. Occupier is not defined in the legislation and 
there has been little case law discussion on the point. In all likelihood, following the 
approach of other areas of the law,329 the question is probably going to be one of 
control. Although it is dangerous to take a definition of a term from one area of law 
                                                
329 Stevens v Bromley London Borough Council [1972] Ch. 400. 
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and import it into another, this definition does seem to tally with the general tenor of 
the provisions.  
There is however more evidence that the Class B person who will be held 
responsible for remediation will be the person we have defined as capable of being 
the steward. This is to be found in the statutory guidance. Firstly, it is made clear that 
the decision here has nothing to do with financial circumstances.330 This is not about 
who is best placed to pay. Secondly, the exclusion tests in the guidance give the 
enforcing authority an indication as to who out of the current owners and occupiers 
should not be held responsible for remediating the land because such persons are not 
seen as suitable to fall under this obligation. Such unsuitable persons are occupiers 
who occupy under a licence which they cannot transfer or which has no market value 
and a lessee who pays rack rent.331 Such persons will not however be excluded under 
Para. D.90 if this would mean that there was no appropriate person left. This makes 
sense because in such circumstances of the stock of identified persons this person 
will remain the most suitable to make decisions about the land because there is no 
one else. Thus the fourth hallmark of stewardship is met. 
(e) Does the regime impact on the decision-making processes of the land owner? 
 
As we established in our discussion of the meaning of steward,332 it is not enough 
that the obligation is to ensure that the land is managed in a responsible way for the 
benefit, at least in part, of future generations. Instead, the system must attempt to 
ensure that the decision-making process itself involves the interests of future 
                                                
330 DEFRA, supra n297, Annex 3, Para D.35. 
331 Ibid, Annex 3, Para D.89. 
332 See pages 89-99. 
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generations. As a result, it is necessary, in discussing this fifth hallmark, to look in 
detail at the decision-making process involved in the implementation of the 
contaminated land provisions. Firstly the task of the local authority to inspect their 
land will be examined. From here there will be discussion of voluntary remediation 
and the processes involved here, and then involuntary remediation which involves a 
remediation notice. It will be seen that although the owner is involved in the 
decision-making, it is essentially the enforcing authority which is left to determine 
the balance that will be struck between the needs of future and present generations.  
Before looking at the decision-making process itself however it is necessary to 
outline the route that goes into ensuring that remediation takes place. The first step 
under section 78A(2) EPA 1990 is that the local authority, following its duty in 
section 78B(1) EPA 1990 to inspect land in its area, makes an initial determination 
that the land is contaminated land. This brings the whole mechanism into play. Once 
this has been determined, the enforcing authority must notify various parties 
including the owner and occupiers of the land whether or not they fall into the 
category of appropriate person under section 78B(3)(b) and (c) EPA 1990. We have 
already established that the owner of the land will fall under an obligation regardless 
of whether they are an appropriate person or not and so it does seem appropriate to 
inform them of this initial determination. 
From here, the enforcing authority is charged to ensure that remediation to the 
required standard takes place in relation to the land.333 In order to do this the 
enforcing authority must serve a remediation notice onto any person who it appears 
to them is an appropriate person. They must endeavour to consult with any person 
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who will be served with the notice334 and any owner or occupier of the land.335 This 
obligation to consult does not apply where there is a risk of imminent danger to the 
land if the remediation is not carried out immediately.336 Crucially, the authority 
cannot serve a remediation notice if it appears to them that those things which would 
be required by the remediation notice have already been or will be carried out 
voluntarily under section 78H(5)(b) EPA 1990. If this does happen, then the person 
who will voluntarily carry out the remediation must prepare a remediation 
statement.337 The alternative to this route is that the enforcing authority exercises its 
powers under section 78N EPA 1990 and carries out the remediation itself, 
recovering the cost of this from an appropriate person under section 78P EPA 1990.  
It is this process that poses the most difficulty for the argument that the contaminated 
land provisions impose stewardship obligations onto the owners of land. At this stage 
it is necessary to sketch out where there is a lack of fit and how we should 
understand what takes place when decisions are made under the contaminated land 
provisions. The first difficulty arises when it is acknowledged that it is the local 
authority who, charged with making the assessment as to whether land is 
contaminated, must decide that harm is being caused to present and future 
generations as a result of the state of the land in question. The owner of the land is 
not charged with making this assessment. If we take the state as the entity to which 
the land owner will be answerable for failures to meet his stewardship obligations,338 
then the initial determination stage bypasses the involvement of the steward. The 
                                                
334 EPA 1990, Section 78H(1)(a). 
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steward is not asked on an on-going basis to assess whether he is meeting his 
obligations. Instead the local authority simply assesses this for him. To this extent 
then it could be said that the determination of the local authority represents the 
answerability aspect of the stewardship obligation, as opposed to the decision-
making part.  
In fact, the bringing into play of the whole regime can be seen as an expression of 
answerability for failure to take account of the needs of future generations, rather 
than forming part of the steward’s decision-making processes. That is, the regime is 
a hybrid of answerability and of decision-making. Our task in this section is to 
determine which aspects of the regime represent the need to call the steward to 
account for his decisions, and which aspects of the regime are truly concerned with 
deciding how the land should be recovered for the benefit of future generations.  
Once the owner of the land is informed that his land is contaminated within the 
meaning of the regime under the enforcing authority’s duty to notify its initial 
determination, the ‘buck’ rests with the owner of the land. He is able to decide that 
he will voluntarily remediate the land or voluntarily grant rights to others to do so. If 
he decides that this is the route he will take, as long as the end result will be the same 
or better than if the enforcing authority served a remediation notice, the owner of the 
land will be entitled to make decisions about the process of remediation himself. The 
remediation works he intends to carry out will be supervised and reviewed by the 
enforcing authority through the remediation statement. 339 The process within the 
                                                
339 DEFRA, supra n297, Annex 2, Para 8.23. This requirement to keep under review the remediation 
which has taken place is not a statutory duty. It does not form part of the legislation or the statutory 
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regime then alternates between allowing the land owner to make decisions, and 
calling him to account for these decisions.  
Where the owner decides not to carry out voluntary remediation, the enforcing 
authority is left to determine how the remediation should in fact be carried out. This, 
it is suggested, is not a matter of answerability. Here the enforcing authority will 
make the decision as to how the owner of the land must carry out his stewardship 
duties. In doing so however it must at least take account of the land owner or 
occupier’s views. This will allow the owner of the land, even where the remediation 
is in fact to be carried out by a Class A person, to express their views as to the best 
and most practicable way to manage the state of the land. The owner is not 
constrained by any controls in what he proposes in this consultation. The enforcing 
authority, by contrast, can only require by way of remediation that which is 
reasonable. We have above discussed the factors that go into this and so the 
enforcing authority must itself take account of the needs of future generations when 
assessing what is proposed by the land owner. It then reviews his comments in this 
light. Again this, it could be argued, is a form of accountability. The land owner’s 
comments can only be taken into account where they will lead to successful and 
reasonable remediation of the land to the required standard.  
Crucially however, where the enforcing authority is to carry out the remediation 
itself, it does not need to serve a remediation statement and so does not need to 
consult the land owner. There are limitations as to when the enforcing authority can 
carry out the remediation itself, as specified in section 78N EPA 1990. Under section 
                                                
the contaminated land provisions and therefore will be followed. The enforcing authority would be 
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78N(3)(b) EPA 1990 the enforcing authority can carry out the remediation, at the 
cost of the appropriate person, where the appropriate person has entered into a 
written agreement to this effect. In cases such as this the appropriate person 
essentially contracts the remediation out to the enforcing authority and in doing so 
makes a decision that the enforcing authority is to carry out this work. This is not a 
case where decision-making is taken away from the landowner.  
There are circumstances within the section however where the landowner will be 
entirely robbed of his ability to make decisions about the remediation steps that will 
be taken on the land. This is especially so where the enforcing authority decides to 
act under section 78N(3)(a) EPA 1990 which specifies that the enforcing authority 
can carry out the remediation itself “where [it] considers it necessary to do anything 
itself by way of remediation for the purpose of preventing the occurrence of any 
serious harm”. In such circumstances it is true that the land owner may have made 
the decision to allow the land to get into its current state, and to that extent this move 
by the enforcing authority will make him accountable for that. Alternatively however 
it could have been the result of the actions of a neighbour, or of a previous owner. 
Thus it is clear that this is not always going to be an issue of accountability.  
In order for the role of the enforcing authority to be limited to calling the steward to 
account, the decision over how to remediate should however be made by the land 
owner, at least in part, if this decision is to be made in accordance with a system of 
stewardship, and that will not always be the case here. Again the enforcing authority 
can act under section 78N(3)(e) EPA 1990 where it decides that it will not recover all 
or some of the cost of remediation. This may not harm the land owner of course, 
since he may not have to pay for any of the remediation to take place even if he is an 
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appropriate person, but he is once again robbed of his power to take decisions of 
what course the remediation will follow.  
There are some circumstances then, even though most enforcing authority 
intervention is about accountability, where the decision-making process adopted by 
the contaminated land provisions is not the process which is essential to a system of 
stewardship. The reason for this is discussed below, and it is suggested that this tells 
us as much about regulating on the basis of stewardship obligations as it does about 
the contaminated land provisions, but it does pose problems for the argument that the 
regime imposes stewardship obligations. 
(f) Do the provisions ensure that the decision-maker is answerable for failures to 
meet his obligations? Is the state a suitable vehicle for this answerability? 
 
Finally, we still must demonstrate that the sort of accountability encountered here is 
compatible with systems of stewardship. Is decision-making and review by the 
enforcing authority an appropriate system of answerability and accountability for a 
stewardship regime? We will discuss here, firstly, the role of the enforcing authority, 
and secondly the role of the courts. It is suggested that there are two forms of 
accountability in play and that each is compatible with a system of stewardship.  
The enforcing authority, as has been established, has an important accountability role 
throughout the process introduced by the contaminated land provisions. Most 
crucially however, it is the enforcing authority that is charged with the 
implementation of the regime. In relation to its on-going supervision - through 
inspection of land to determine whether it is contaminated, to on-going monitoring of 
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the remediation works - the enforcing authority is tasked with ensuring that the 
owner complies with his stewardship obligations. Is this accountability sufficient to 
meet the requirement that the steward be answerable? Is the enforcing authority 
suitable to act in this role? As far as the first question is concerned, it is submitted 
that the local authority involvement in the decision-making process is sufficient as a 
tool for ensuring accountability. At all stages the guidance and legislation directs the 
local authority and as we have seen above these provisions contain sufficient 
information for the local authority to ensure that the overriding stewardship 
obligation that is contained within these provisions is complied with.  
It is also argued here that the local authority is a suitable candidate for enforcer of the 
obligation. We have established that the rights introduced by the provisions vest in 
future generations. As a result these generations cannot themselves protect their 
rights. In Attfield’s terms, a proxy is required.340 This proxy must not only represent 
the interests of future generations as expressed in the legislation, but must also not 
detract from the focus on localised decision-making represented by stewardship. A 
local authority is well suited to this task. It has sufficient knowledge of the local area, 
and sufficient powers, to ensure that the steward acts responsibly. It is also an 
integral part of the democratic process. Although local authorities are put together on 
the basis of current needs and preferences as expressed through elections, they can 
also act as representatives of the future. The members of a local authority have wide-
ranging expertise and views and so it is legitimate to allocate the task of 
accountability to the local authority.  
                                                
340 See page 74. 
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It must be noted here however that the Environment Agency is not an elected body 
and so when a site is designated as a special site such that it falls under the control of 
the EA, the decision-making process is no longer part of this democratic process. 
This does not however prevent our conclusion that the EA can have an important role 
to play in this system and that this role is compatible with the overall idea that the 
state is the appropriate forum for accountability. The EA only becomes involved in 
particular cases and significantly it does so once the local authority has informed 
them of the contamination. The local authority therefore still starts the process of 
accountability. In addition, the EA is an expert body and whilst the elected nature of 
local authorities is useful for many cases of contaminated land, where the decisions 
to be made are not primarily scientific, but costs-based and political, the scientific 
and environmental expertise of the EA has a crucial role to play in the overall 
provision of information into the accountability process. 
The enforcing authority also has another task in terms of accountability. If they 
believe that prosecution for the offence of failing to comply with a remediation 
notice will be insufficient, they can also ensure that the remediation notice is carried 
out by bringing an action in the High Court. It is thus a matter for the enforcing 
authority to decide that the normal sanction for failure to comply with the 
stewardship obligations is insufficiently strong in a particular case. Again it seems 
appropriate to allocate this task to the enforcing authority since they will be aware 
firstly of the urgency and importance of ensuring compliance with the remediation 
notice, and secondly, through their negotiations with the land owner, the likelihood 
of a small fine representing a sufficient sanction. 
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The courts will however have a crucial role to play, both in ensuring compliance 
with the remediation notice in assessing whether the offence of non-compliance has 
been committed, and in assessing whether another sanction should be imposed in 
proceedings in the High Court. The final question we must ask then in analysing the 
regime, is whether the role of the court as reviewer of the land owner’s actions is 
compatible with a regime based on stewardship. It seems that it is. The court (in 
cases where the remediation notice is served by the Environment Agency, the 
Secretary of State has these powers)341 can review the contents of the remediation 
notice to ensure that it complies with the legislation and the guidance; it can hear 
appeals on the designation of a person as an appropriate person; it can determine 
whether the owner of land has committed an offence by not granting rights of entry 
etc or by not complying with a remediation notice; and it can decide whether the 
ensuring fine is sufficient in the circumstances. The courts in this sense then have the 
final say as to whether the obligations in the regime have been complied with and 
what action must be taken to ensure this.  
We established above that the key to the steward is that he is able to make the final 
decision about the fate of his land, and that this decision be recognised by society as 
such. Does the role of the court as final decision-maker here mean that the owner of 
land cannot be considered the steward? It is submitted here that it does not for the 
reason that the court acts as the final reviewer, the final assessor of accountability. 
The court will determine whether the stewardship obligations have been breached, 
and its decision on this is final.  
                                                
341 Appeals against remediation notices served by the Environment Agency are made to the Secretary 
of State, EPA 1990, Section 78L(1)(b). 
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The final decision on the fate of the land however, if he complies with his 
stewardship obligations to their fullest extent, will rest with the land owner and this 
is the key to the contaminated land regime as a regime based on stewardship. As long 
as the land owner behaves as a steward should, he will decide the fate of his land in 
order to promote a balance between the interests of current and future generations. If 
he fails to do so the mechanism of the contaminated land provisions will review his 
decisions and call him to account for this. The enforcing authority will be involved in 
the decision-making process, and will itself make certain decisions. This much is 
admitted, but it is suggested that the overall shape of the regime is in part one of 
stewardship. 
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VII: Explanation of the lack of fit between the provisions and the hallmarks of 
stewardship 
 
There are therefore two key areas where there is a lack of fit between our hallmarks 
of stewardship and the regime. The first, and most important area of conflict is where 
the land owner is not the primary decision-maker in terms of the process of 
remediation.342 Secondly, the interests that are protected are not framed in terms of 
the future per se but rather under current use and use possible under the current 
planning permissions with any references to the future limited by foreseeability.343 Is 
it possible then to conclude then that this regime is a ‘good example’ of stewardship, 
and if so, how? There is no question that the contaminated land provisions do not 
impose a ‘pure’ stewardship regime, nor has this thesis attempted to prove that. 
Instead, it is suggested, that there is an important aspect of this regime which is 
overlooked. Despite the regime not being a perfect example of stewardship, there is 
good reason for this lack of complete fit. The lack of fit should not prevent us from 
interpreting the regime is such a way as to give best effect to its varied aims, one of 
which is to ensure that land is maintained for the benefit of future generations.  
Both of the major ‘misfits’ relate to the nature of decisions that must be undertaken 
in a regime that is based on a philosophy of stewardship. There are two fundamental 
difficulties with the workability of such a regime- unknowability and unworkability- 
and the contaminated land provisions manage to solve these difficulties. In doing so 
the regime may move away from stewardship in some of its elements, but it is 
                                                
342 See pages 123-239. 
343 See pages 117-121. 
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suggested that it would not be possible to operate under a regime based purely on 
stewardship. Instead, it will be argued, the one of philosophies behind the regime is 
stewardship and that this philosophy causes the drafters of legislation some 
difficulty. This difficulty is avoided leading to a compromise, but this does not 
change the fact that stewardship obligations or something very like them form an 
integral part of this regime.  
(a) The decision-making process 
 
The first problem that must be addressed is whether the decision-making process is 
compatible with the conclusion that the contaminated land regime imposes 
obligations based on stewardship. There were three central stages to the decision-
making process that caused difficulty.344 These were: the role of the local authority in 
making the initial determination that land is contaminated; the limits on the role of 
the owner of the land in putting together the remediation notice; and finally the 
possibility that the enforcing authority take charge of the remediation itself thus 
avoiding consultation with the owner. It is submitted that these difficulties do not 
prevent the conclusion that the regime is based on stewardship for the reason that 
these stages in the process represent a necessary compromise between the desire to 
involve the owner of the land and the need to ensure that remediation is in fact 
carried out.  
Many land owners ‘brought up’ under the English approach to property ownership345 
will be reluctant, to say the least, to act altruistically in relation to their land and the 
                                                
344 See pages 123-129. 
345 See pages 82-89. 
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contaminated land provisions solve this problem. The prevailing approach to land 
ownership is that land is a resource available for use by the owner; not that land is a 
burden that entails obligation. This problem of approach is one that the contaminated 
land regime does not attempt to tackle head-on, but instead tries to avoid. For most, 
land is the most valuable asset they possess and many will want, and perhaps more 
crucially, need, to maximise this financial value. It goes without saying that 
remediated land is likely to be more valuable then contaminated land in the long-
term, but this does not mean that the owner will have the financial ability to carry out 
the remediation works in the short-term. It is also true that the land owner may not 
recover the costs of remediation quickly. Leaving the owner as primary decision-
maker may therefore be an inefficient way to ensure that the aims of stewardship are 
met since there will not always be a strong, or indeed any, financial incentive for the 
owner to remediate the land due to the heavy initial outlay of money required.  
There are two potential solutions to this. The first is to regulate on the basis that 
personal preference should be removed from the picture such that the ‘decision’ is 
taken out of the land owner’s hands. The second is to attempt to regulate in order to 
change personal preference. The second solution would be more compatible with the 
ethics of stewardship, but significantly more difficult and less likely to be 
immediately successful. The first option, the one taken by the contaminated land 
provisions, takes some elements of the decision out of the land owner’s hands, either 
through allowing the state to make the decision, or by making the decision-maker 
strictly answerable to the state. The contaminated land provisions, it has been 
suggested, take both of these approaches at different places within the regime.  
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The first option, viz. total delegation of decision-making to the state, can be seen 
where the enforcing authority uses its powers to intervene and carry out the 
remediation itself where it considers that there is an immediate danger of significant 
harm. In this case, although the decision to intervene in the first place can be seen as 
an aspect of answerability to the land community as a whole through its proxy, the 
state, in that the intervention of the enforcing authority is in itself a sanction to 
ensure compliance with the obligations of stewardship. On the other hand, the 
consequent lack of consultation with the owner is indeed related to decision-making. 
This is however a necessary power if the contaminated land provisions are to have 
any real bite, especially in cases of some urgency. The consultation requirements will 
certainly delay proceedings, and in cases of self-interest, the owner can use these 
requirements to his advantage to limit the scope of his liabilities in costs or to 
remediate. If the end-goals of the stewardship ethic are to be met, the owner of land 
cannot be permitted to behave in this way. This aspect of the regime simply 
recognises that self-interest cannot be allowed to override its wider objectives.  
The regime too adopts the ‘strict’ approach to answerability. It is extremely 
problematic to attempt to introduce an obligation based on subjective consideration. 
At its most simple level it is almost impossible to oblige someone to think in a 
certain way. As a result, the owner is made answerable, not for whether he truly 
considered the needs of future generations when assessing how to manage his land, 
but whether the end result of his decision-making promotes these needs. This will 
generally only happen however where the owner has not become involved, at a much 
earlier stage, in voluntary remediation. Most contaminated land is being cleaned up 
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through voluntary remediation regulated through the planning process.346 The local 
planning authority will grant planning permission only, in many cases, if the land is 
remediated but the owner can simply conclude that he will not carry out his proposed 
development. He is able to decide that he would rather manage his land in its 
contaminated state.  
At this stage the enforcing authority may step in and identity the land as 
contaminated. When this is done a strict assessment is made on the outcome of the 
owner’s decision-making, not on the process. Again when the enforcing authority 
consults the land owner in the composition of the remediation notice, if the land 
owner makes contributions which are in fact in the interests of future generations as 
expressed in the standard ‘suitable for use’, then the authority will take account of 
this decision and filter the information into the remediation notice. If however the 
owner’s preferences for the method of remediation are not in fact in accordance with 
these future interests, even if the owner believes that they are or has given extensive 
thought to the balance between current and future interests, the enforcing authority 
may not include them in the remediation notice.  
The regime attempts to make it in the owner’s self-interest, at least in part, to act on 
the basis of trying to promote the interests of future generations. This means that the 
regime, rather than attempting to rely on the land owner acting altruistically, actually 
seeks in places to change the balance of the owner’s self-interests by giving him 
increased decision-making power when he does attempt to promote the interests of 
current and future generations. Thus the regime avoids the practical problem of 
enforceability that a regime based on stewardship inevitably faces and especially so 
                                                
346 See also page 33-34.  
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where the property being considered is land given its durability and central 
importance to life. It solves the special practical problems related to stewardship of 
land in a way which is compatible with the underlying philosophy of stewardship. 
(b) Future interests and foreseeability. 
 
The same conclusion can be reached in relation to the second problem of the 
limitation of future interests to those which coincide with present interests under the 
current use or in some cases those future interests which are foreseeable. Regulatory 
certainty and predictability would be impossible to achieve if the regime simply 
stated that the land should be used in such a way as to benefit future generations 
since these needs are themselves uncertain. There is simply no way of telling at this 
point what will benefit future generations. As Attfield states, “Current needs are 
usually discoverable with greater certainty than future needs, and are often more 
amenable to satisfaction… Present needs, however, should not be prioritised ahead 
of future needs as such… the rectification of current injustices is often a prerequisite 
for environmental justice in future generations”.347  
Such a regime would be unworkable or at least unpredictable. As a result the 
contaminated land provisions restrict the time scale for consideration. The interests 
of future generations must be taken into account on the assumption that all planning 
permissions for the land remain static. This has two key results. Firstly, this allows 
the regime to escape the trap of unknowable information in that it avoids the 
enforcing authority and the owner needing to guess what uses the land may be put to 
                                                
347 Robin Attfield, The Ethics of the Global Environment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999) at 163.  
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in the future. It also limits the need to take account of the argument that what 
constitutes a ‘good life’ may be different in the future.348 This is not a question over 
what use land will be put to in the future, but what constitutes ‘suitable’ in this 
context. Although we can say for certain that suitable for use might include food 
which is not harmful when eaten, and potable water, it does not tell us what state a 
building must be in before we conclude that it is no longer suitable as a stimulus for 
artistic endeavour. The solution in the regime solves this problem very neatly.  
It does not limit the length of time to be taken into account, but closes off options for 
change over that time. The concept of suitable for use in theory is indefinite if it is 
assumed from the outset that the planning permission, and therefore the use of the 
land, is fixed. Thus if it is assumed that Whiteacre will always be used for residential 
accommodation including homes with children, then it is possible to draw a picture 
as to what might be harmful to the users of this land indefinitely. Similarly when 
foreseeability is relied upon, we are asked to calculate future interests only on the 
basis of information that we can reasonably suppose to be true.  
Thus we can reasonably suppose that an ancient monument in a complete state of 
disrepair will be less inspirational that one in pristine condition, and that ‘suitability’ 
will probably be reached somewhere in the middle. Again, when considering 
protected species and population numbers, we can reasonably suppose that toxic 
chemicals in the soil will affect the population numbers of animals which eat grain. 
This would have an adverse impact on future population numbers. The regime would 
allow action on this. If however the toxins are not passed on through grain, but 
                                                
348 For discussion of the meaning of the ‘good life’ an ecological context see Holmes Rolston III, “Is 
there an Ecological Ethic?” (1975) 85 Ethics 93 at 95. 
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instead wash into a nearby river, the impact this may have on flower species in the 
area might limit bee numbers and prevent grain fertilisation. This might have an 
impact on the population numbers of species eating the grain, but it is not easy to 
conclude one way or another that this impact is ‘foreseeable’. As a result, any regime 
which does not limit the scope of future interests that should be taken into account 
risks becoming unworkable because of the inherent uncertainty. The limitation of 
foreseeability avoids the problem of lack of scientific knowledge and the approach to 
the regime advocated in R (Redland Minerals Ltd) v Secretary of State for the 
Environment confirms that the regime is capable of operating even where there is 
such scientific uncertainty.349   
The Consultation Paper issued in December 2010 makes clear “decisions will have to 
be taken in the fact of scientific uncertainty over the nature of risks at sites”.350 
Forseeability then allows action to promote future interests where the future is not 
certain, but not where we can have no idea what impact the current state of the land 
might have on future. This is again a pragmatic solution to the problem that a system 
based on stewardship presents and is an effective way of carrying out the balance 
between future and current interests. The contaminated land provisions in solving the 
keys problems of regulation on the basis of stewardship are therefore good examples 
of such regulation. They attempt, at least in part, to ensure the aims of stewardship 
without falling into the trap of unknowability and unworkability and although this is 
                                                
349 R (On the application of Redland Minerals Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, [2010] EWHC 913 (Admin), [2011] Env. L. R. 2 at para 18. 
350 United Kingdom, DEFRA, Public Consultation on Changes to the Contaminated Land Regime 
under Part 2A of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (London, 2010) at para 47(a). 
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not perfectly achieved, it is something that this paper suggests should be 
acknowledged and acted upon. 
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VIII: What are the implications of this analysis for application and interpretation of 
the contaminated and regime? 
 
The final issue that this paper will examine then is what implications the argument 
presented here has for the application and interpretation of the contaminated land 
provisions. It is clear that if the provisions do indeed place stewardship obligations 
onto the owners of land then we should approach the question of who should be held 
responsible for the state of their land from this perspective. It is suggested that this 
would be quite a significant change to the current approach. The provisions have not 
received very detailed treatment in the courts.351 The cases concerned with the 
regime do not generally engage with the philosophy behind the regime as has been 
seen above, and what treatment the regime have received implies that the courts and 
local authorities are reluctant to impose obligations on land owners where they did 
not cause or knowingly permit the contaminating substance to enter the land, 
especially when dealing with residential accommodation. This is despite the clear 
guidance that the financial circumstances and identity of the individual are not to be 
taken into account except where remediation will cause hardship.352 
In order to demonstrate this R (National Grid Gas PLC) v Environment Agency353 
will be examined in more detail. This key case on the provisions demonstrates that 
the current approach to interpretation of the regime is inconsistent with the argument 
presented here as to the underlying philosophy behind the regime. The focus of this 
case was the position of statutory successors as potential Class A persons and the 
                                                
351 See pages 37-39. 
352 EPA 1990, Section 78P(2). 
353 [2007] UKHL, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1780. 
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main conclusion of the case seems to be satisfactory in terms of compliance with the 
regime (even if there might be good policy reasons to abandon the approach 
outlined). The court concluded that statutory successors to companies which caused 
or knowingly permitted a substance to enter land will not be responsible for the 
remediation of the land as a Class A person. The court also had to deal however with 
the decision of the Environment Agency that they would not pursue the owners of 
the land to ensure remediation even if there was no Class A person.  
Lord Scott in his judgment highlights that: “the agency has a discretion, having 
regard to hardship that recovery might cause, to decide not to recover the whole or 
part of its costs from a particular appropriate person… In the present case the agency 
has made clear its intention not to pursue any of the present owners or occupiers of 
the 11 residences for recovery of the cost of the remediation works it has carried out 
at their respective properties”.354 In order to support this argument he draws on 
section 78P(2). It is certainly true that in determining whether to recover costs the 
authority is entitled to take account of potential hardship that might be caused in 
recovering the costs and has a wide discretion in so-doing. It is important however to 
bear in mind the general approach of the regime which is that land owners, in the 
absence of a Class A person, should carry out the remediation themselves or meet the 
costs of the remediation.  
When this position is acknowledged, along with the stewardship obligations that the 
regime imposes, the Environment Agency was perhaps too hasty to conclude that the 
individual home owners were not to face any of the costs of remediation. The court’s 
attitude seems to mirror this conclusion in paragraph 21 of Lord Scott’s judgment 
                                                
354 [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1780 at Para 18. 
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where he agrees with the argument that the legislation was adopted “on the principle 
that the polluter should pay and that innocent owners or occupiers of contaminated 
land should not have to pay. I have no doubt that that was so and have no quarrel 
with that principle”. It is suggested that this argument flies in the face of the scheme 
of the regime. The courts appear to be having difficulty in seeing that this regime is 
not based on fault. There is no doubt that the regime prioritises the polluter pays 
principle. This can be seen from the primary liability for cleaning up contaminated 
land resting on those who cause or knowingly permit substances to enter land, as has 
been discussed above. Behind this principle, however, there are extensive obligations 
that rest on the owner of land, ‘innocent’ or not, and these obligations can be viewed 
as relying on the concept of stewardship.  
It seems then that in this case the court and the Environment Agency were concerned 
not to impose responsibility onto the owners of the land, despite this aspect of the 
regime forming a critical plank of its make-up, because they did not consider it to be 
fair to impose all, or more importantly any of the costs onto the residents themselves. 
The Environment Agency’s assessment of their ability to recover costs reflects this 
reluctance. “Cost recovery can be used to reimburse public funds for remediation 
costs from appropriate persons, but this has had very limited use”.355 This attitude is 
repeated at page 32 of “Reporting the Evidence” where the Agency report argues that 
“it is not always possible to find an appropriate person who may be liable for sites 
and, in these cases, the taxpayer may ultimately pay for remediating them”.356 
Contrary to this argument it is almost always possible to find an appropriate person 
within the definition given by the regime. The regulatory authorities are reluctant to 
                                                
355 Environment Agency, “Reporting the Evidence” (Bristol: 2009) at 26. 
356 Ibid at 32. 
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impose liability onto a person who by definition is appropriate to bear the cost on the 
ground, one assumes, that this will cause land owners ‘hardship’. Of the sites where 
liability had been determined up to March 2007, government and other public 
funding had paid for the remediation of 282 sites; Class B persons had paid for just 
26.357 
Local authority policy documents also demonstrate this attitude. The Ribble Valley 
Borough Council website states for example that “Owners and occupiers of domestic 
properties are not usually liable for these costs”.358 This is not because there is 
usually a Class A person to bear the cost of remediation, but because local authorities 
are reluctant to impose liability onto home owners. Another example, taken from a 
policy statement of South Oxfordshire District Council, is that local authorities see 
“The decision to waive or reduce any cost to the Class B person will be to the extent 
needed to ensure that the Class B person in question bears no more of the cost of 
remediation than it appears reasonable to impose”.359 The policy of the regime 
however is not whether it is reasonable to recover costs from land owners.  
The policy is that it is reasonable to recover costs except where hardship is caused as 
can be seen from the Government Response to the Second Report of the 
Environment Committee (Session 1996-1997): Contaminated Land which states that: 
“the draft statutory guidance has been rewritten and expanded to provide a clear 
basis on cases where recovery of costs from homeowners and others should be 
                                                
357 Ibid at 21. 
358United, Kingdom, Ribble Valley Borough Council, 12th Oct 2010,    
<http://www.ribblevalley.gov.uk/a_to_z/service/412/function.simplexml-load-file>. 
359 United Kingdom, South Oxfordshire District Council, “Policy for the Recovery of Remediation 
Costs for Contaminated Land”, 12th Oct 2010, 
<http://www.southoxon.gov.uk/ccm/content/envhealth/environmental-protection/contaminated-land-
pages/contaminated-land-faqs.en>. 
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waived or reduced”.360 In other words, there is no general policy of not recovering 
costs from homeowners. Despite this again the Rossendale Borough Council 
Contaminated Land Inspection Strategy highlights the cost implications of 
remediation and indicates that the public purse may have to pay for remediation but 
does not discuss the possibility of requiring home-owners to pay.361  
Local authorities rely on the concept of ‘hardship’, but hardship must go beyond 
being made responsible for the cost of remediation where the person did not cause or 
permit the contamination. Certainly the total cost of remediation may be too much 
for home owners to afford, but this does not mean that they will suffer hardship by 
making even a small contribution. This paper has attempted to show that there are 
very important considerations with strong ethical justifications based on justice to 
future generations which would make it fair to impose liability for the cost of 
remediation onto the landowners in these circumstances.  
As a result, it is suggested that the approach which sees liability where there has been 
no action leading to the contamination as unjustified is missing a significant element 
of the philosophy and reality of the regime. The regime represents a move away from 
the liberal absolute conception of property rights which sees property as an asset as 
opposed to a liability and yet thus far the approach used in applying the regime has 
not recognised this. Perhaps this is why the contaminated land provisions are seen as 
a classic case of regulatory failure -362 the philosophy behind the regime is not 
                                                
360 United Kingdom, Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee, “Government 
Response to the Second Report of the Environment Committee (Session 1996-1997): Contaminated 
Land- Report and Proceedings of the Committee” (London: HMSO, 1999) Page xiii, para 47. 
361 United Kingdom, Rossendale Borough Council, “Contaminated Land Inspection Strategy” 
(Rossendale: 2003), at pages 32-33. 
362 Stephen Vaughan, “The Contaminated Land Regime: Still Suitable for Use” [2010] Journal of 
Planning Law 142 at 142. 
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feeding into the interpretation and application of its provisions and with 90% of 
identified contaminated sites being currently used for housing,363 this problem has 
serious implications for the success of the regime. 
                                                
363 Ibid at 146. 
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IX: Conclusion 
 
Drawing all these threads together then, what can be distilled from this discussion is 
that although the contaminated land provisions do to a large extent embody the 
notion of polluter pays, they do so in part against a background of stewardship, and 
this should be recognised when applying and interpreting the regime. In order to 
demonstrate this, extensive consideration was given to the meaning of stewardship. 
By looking at the justifications for stewardship as a moral principle, it was possible 
to determine that stewardship looks to create a balance between the needs of the 
present and the interests of the future. These interests are both anthropological and 
ecological and apply to the whole range of factors that go into land resource use and 
management. Both intergenerational and interspecies justice and religious 
justifications look to stewardship as the key to responsible land ownership.  
 
In order to give effect to this moral principle, a legal regime based on stewardship 
must impose an obligation on the person most entitled to take decisions over the 
future of land to manage his land responsibly with a view to protecting future 
interests and it must do so with the aim of ensuring that the basic needs of future 
humans are protected, along with those things needed to allow the flourishing of 
distinctive human characteristics. The obligation must change the decision-making 
process employed by the owner of land and he must be accountable for the decision 
reached.  
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The contaminated land provisions to a large extent meet these requirements. Where 
the requirements are not fully met - when the regime limits the scope of future 
interests that can be taken into account, and where local authorities becomes 
decision-makers in place of the owner of the land - the lack of fit can be explained by 
the difficulties of regulating on the basis of stewardship. The fit is not perfect, but 
this does not mean that we cannot consider stewardship when looking at the regime. 
This tells us much about how we should interpret the contaminated land provisions, 
and above all it demonstrates that there are good reasons grounded in justice why 
land owners who did not cause or permit contamination of their land should still be 
liable to remediate the land or to pay, at least in part, for that remediation. It is hoped 
that this conclusion will be taken on board by those applying the regime. The biggest 
barrier to solving the problem of historical contaminated and allowing the state of 
land to be improved for the benefit of successive generations is funding and owners 
of land are not being made to pay their share of the costs. It is time, it is suggested, 
that the contaminated land provisions are understood in light of their aims and the 
philosophy behind them and applied accordingly. The regime does challenge the 
traditional liberal property theory and we should recognise this rather than 
attempting to mitigate against this challenge. 
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